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INTRODUCTION

In Farmers Branch, Texas, the city council enacted a measure
to fine landlords who rent their premises to unauthorized migrants,'
and in Arizona, the state legislature passed a law imposing stiff
penalties on employers who intentionally or knowingly hire
unauthorized migrants. 2 In San Francisco, the board of supervisors
passed a measure that bars law enforcement officers from inquiring
into the immigration status of an individual in the course of a criminal
investigation. 3 In Alabama and Florida, state officials have entered
into agreements with the federal government permitting state law
enforcement officers to arrest and detain non-citizens on immigration
charges. 4 Other examples of non-federal involvement in immigration
abound. 5 Although these efforts vary in type and political orientation,
increased state and local involvement in immigration-often referred
to as "immigration federalism" 6-- is one of the most important
developments in immigration policy.
1.
See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (May 12, 2007), available at
http://www.ci.farmers-branch.tx.us/Communication/Ordinance%2No%202903.doc
(setting forth
this restriction and others). The ordinance was temporarily enjoined in June 2007. Villas at
Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 760 (N.D. Tex. 2007).
2.
ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-212 (2007).
3.

See S.F., CAL., ADMIN. CODE § 12H.2 (2007) (prohibiting the use of "any city funds or

resources to assist in the enforcement of federal immigration law or to gather or disseminate
information regarding the immigration status of individuals in the City and County of San
Francisco unless such assistance is required by federal or State statute, regulation, or court
decision"); § 12H.21 ("[N]o officer, employee or law enforcement agency ... shall stop, question,
arrest or detain any individual solely because of the individual's national origin or immigration
status."). Other cities have similar measures. See Orde F. Kittrie, Federalism, Deportation,and
Crime Victims Afraid to Call the Police, 91 IOWA L. REV. 1449, 1466-75 (2006) (describing similar
"sanctuary policies" adopted by numerous major cities including Denver, Houston, Los Angeles,
and New York).
4.
See Fact Sheet: Section 287(g) Immigration and Nationality Act, U.S. Immigration and
Customs
Enforcement
2
(Aug.
16,
2006),
available at
http://www.ice.gov/
doclib/pi/news/factsheets/060816dc287gfactsheet.pdf. The federal government has signed similar
agreements with agencies in Arizona, California, and North Carolina. See id.
5.
In 2007, states enacted 240 immigration-related laws covering topics ranging from
public benefits to education to identification requirements. NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE
LEGISLATURES, 2007 ENACTED STATE LEGISLATION RELATED TO IMMIGRANTS AND IMMIGRATION

(2007), available at http://www.ncsl.org/programs/immig/20071mmigrationfinal.htm.
6.
See Peter J. Spiro, Learning to Live with Immigration Federalism, 29 CONN. L. REV.
1627, 1627 (1997) (crediting Hiroshi Motomura with the term "immigration federalism"); see also
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The legality and propriety of immigration federalism has
sparked a vigorous debate among legal scholars. The vast majority of
scholars decry it. Some scholars express concern that state and local
governments are more likely to engage in discrimination against noncitizens. 7 Others fear that giving state and local law enforcement
officers a role in the enforcement of federal immigration law will
discourage non-citizens from reporting crimes8 and encourage racial
profiling. 9 On the other side of the debate, some scholars welcome the
assistance of state and local officers as the "quintessential force
multiplier," noting benefits for national security and enforcement of
immigration law generally. 10 Finally, other scholars acknowledge the
inevitability of immigration federalism and find a potential silver
lining.11
Hiroshi Motomura, Federalism,InternationalHuman Rights, and Immigration Exceptionalism,
70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1361, 1361 (1999) (defining immigration federalism as "states and localities
play[ing a role] in making and implementing law and policy relating to immigration and
immigrants").
7.
See Michael J. Wishnie, Laboratoriesof Bigotry? Devolution of the Immigration Power,
Equal Protection, and Federalism, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 493, 515-18 (2001) (describing
discriminatory state laws passed pursuant to a federal law permitting states to determine
eligibility of non-citizens for public benefits and anticipating more such laws in the next
economic downturn).
8.
See Kittrie, supra note 3, at 1450-55 (describing disincentives for unauthorized
migrants to report crimes to the police). Scholars also have questioned the authority of state and
local governments to enforce federal immigration law. See Michael J. Wishnie, State and Local
Police Enforcement of Immigration Laws, 6 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1084, 1088-95 (2004) (arguing
that state and local police have no "inherent authority" to enforce federal immigration laws and
that any enforcement authority they may have has been preempted by federal law).
9.
See Huyen Pham, The ConstitutionalRight Not to Cooperate? Local Sovereignty and the
FederalImmigrationPower, 74 U. CINN. L. REV. 1373, 1400-01 (2006) ("[I]f local authorities start
enforcing immigration laws without proper training, they are prone to engage in racial profiling
or other abuses of authority."); Wishnie, supra note 8, at 1102-15 (describing concern of racial
profiling with increased use of state and local enforcement of federal immigration law).
10. See Kris W. Kobach, The Quintessential Force Multiplier: The Inherent Authority of
Local Police to Make ImmigrationArrests, 69 ALB. L. REV. 179, 183-99 (2006) (listing situations
in which immigration-based arrests by state and local officials have been crucial). Policymakers
have made this argument as well. See Jeff Sessions & Cynthia Hayden, The Growing Role for
State & Local Enforcement in the Realm of Immigration Law, 16 STAN. L. & POL'Y REV. 323, 32729 (2005) (describing the need for state and local enforcement of federal immigration law).
11. See Spiro, supra note 6, at 1628-46 (describing possible benefit of immigration
federalism's "steam valve" function, whereby states with strong anti-immigrant sentiment pass
state legislation embodying these views and do not seek federal legislation that would impose
such views on the entire nation; also noting the potential reasons why immigration federalism
may not lead to a race to the bottom in anti-immigrant legislation); see also Victor C. Romero,
Devolution and Discrimination,58 N.Y.U. ANN. SuRv. AM. L. 377, 381-85 (2002) (arguing that
devolution will not cure racist immigration policies, but that it could benefit same-sex partners if
federal immigration law, contrary to the Defense of Marriage Act, recognized same-sex unions
sanctioned by states).
A comprehensive assessment of the constitutionality of immigration federalism has only just
begun. In addition to this Article, two other recent articles address federal exclusivity in
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Immigration federalism also has become a central political
issue of our time. Legislators at all levels of government are engaged
in a rancorous debate over the propriety of immigration federalism,
and the issue has led to numerous confrontations between the political
13
branches of governments. 12 As with the debate among legal scholars,
4
emotions run high.'
Finally, the legality of immigration federalism is the subject of
increasing litigation in the federal courts. Several lawsuits have been
filed challenging state and local enactments,1 5 and trial courts are
immigration. See Cristina Rodriguez, The Significance of the Local in Immigration Regulation,
106 MICH. L. REV. 567, 571-72, 609-17 (2008) (arguing against federal exclusivity because, as a
functional matter, all levels of government operate as an integrated system to manage
immigration and particularly assimilation); Peter H. Schuck, Taking Immigration Federalism
Seriously, 2007 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 57, 57-92 (arguing against federal exclusivity, also as a
functional matter, at least with respect to three areas of immigration policy-employment-based
admissions, criminal justice, and employer sanctions-and noting that states, even immigrantreceiving states with large populations of unauthorized migrants, can be more generous than the
federal government). For earlier assessments, see Peter J. Spiro, The States and Immigration in
an Era of Demi-Sovereignties, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 121, 121-78 (1994) [hereinafter Spiro, DemiSovereignties] (addressing federal exclusivity largely from the perspective of international law),
and Wishnie, supra note 7, at 527-58 (arguing against immigration federalism in any form).
12. See, e.g., Jason DeParle, Star of the Right Loses His Base at the Border, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 29, 2006, at Al (describing downturn in political fortunes of Mike Pence, U.S.
Representative, R-Ind., who, after seeking compromise on a federal immigration bill, has become
the object of scorn among conservatives); see also Joseph Lelyveld, The Border Dividing Arizona,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 40 (describing the ongoing battle between
Republican Arizona state legislator Russell Pearce, who has helped pass nine laws to discourage
illegal immigration, and Democratic governor Janet Napolitano, who has vetoed each bill on
"fiscal and constitutional grounds, urging [Pearce] and his Republican supporters to stop playing
'political games"'). This battle occurred before Arizona passed legislation that the governor
signed. See infra note 60 (describing the legislation and quoting the governor's reasons for
signing it).
13. See Kobach, supra note 10, at 227-33 (assailing arguments asserted by Professors
Wishnie and Pham as "bizarre," containing "crucial mistakes," "unsustainable," and "selective
and untenable"); Wishnie, supra note 7, at 497-98 ("[A] number of states already have accepted
the federal invitation to discriminate .... Moreover, there will come a time when state budgets
are not so flush, and when episodic American nativism returns. Then, more states will try to
balance their budgets on the backs of indigent immigrants.").
14. See Tony Horwitz, Immigration-andthe Curse of the Black Legend, N.Y. TIMES, July 9,
2006, at D13 (quoting U.S. Representative Tom Tancredo, R-Col., and then-chair of the House
Immigration Reform Caucus, describing illegal immigration as "a scourge" abetted by "a cult of
multiculturalism" that has "a death grip" on this nation, and further contending that "[w]e are
committing cultural suicide ... [t]he barbarians at the gate will only need to give us a slight
push, and the emaciated body of Western civilization will collapse in a heap"). The issue is also
pulling apart communities. See Alex Kotlowitz, Our Town, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 5, 2007, § 6
(Magazine), at 30 (describing community-wide schisms in Carpentersville, Illinois, over
immigration and the appropriate response to it).
15. See, e.g., Complaint at 10-11, Vasquez v. City of Farmers Branch, No. 3-O0CV2376-R
(N.D. Tex. filed Dec. 26, 2006), available at http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrim/
277941g120061226.html (alleging, inter alia, that the regulation violates the Supremacy Clause
because it attempts to regulate a matter exclusively reserved to the federal government, and that
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beginning to issue opinions.16 In these early decisions, courts are
17
reaching conflicting conclusions.
This debate and these initial court decisions misunderstand the
nature of federal exclusivity in immigration. As a descriptive matter,
the federal government alone establishes the content of "pure"
immigration law-the rules governing the admission and removal of
non-citizens. Courts and scholars, however, widely accept this
description of federal dominance as constitutionally mandated,
believing that the Constitution commits authority over immigration
law solely to the federal government.18 This is the structural
preemption view of immigration authority: an understanding that the
Constitution withdraws immigration authority from the states and
grants it to the national government.1 9
it additionally violates the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment); Complaint at 14-15, 18-20, Garret v. City of Escondido, No. 06 CV 2434 (S.D. Cal.
filed Nov. 3, 2006), available at http://www.cooley.comlfiles/tbl-s5SiteRepository/FileUpload21/
927/Federal%201awsuit.pdf (asserting largely the same causes of action); Complaint at 38-47,
Lozano v. City of Hazleton, No. 6-cv-56-JMM (M.D. Pa. filed Oct. 30, 2006), available at
http://www.aclu.org/immigrants/discrini27220lgl20061030.html (same); see also Complaint at
10-15, Valle del Sol, Inc. v. Goddard, 2:07-cv-02518-SMM (D. Ariz. filed Dec. 12, 2007), available
at http://www.aclu.org/pdfs/immigrants/valledelsol_v_goddardcomplaint.pdf (same).
16. See Ariz. Contractors Ass'n v. Candelaria, Nos. CV07-02496-PHX-NVW, CV07-02518PHX-NVW, 2008 WL 343082, at *5-15, *17-21 (D. Ariz. Feb. 7, 2008) (denying motion for
preliminary injunction of the Legal Arizona Workers Act, and finding the Act not preempted by
federal law and not violative of the Due Process Clause); Gray v. Valley Park, No. 4:07CV00881
ERW, 2008 WL 294294, at *31 (E.D. Mo. Jan. 31, 2008) (granting defendant's motion for
summary judgment on the basis that the challenged local employment and housing laws are not
preempted by federal law and also do not violate the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses);
Villas at Parkside v. City of Farmers Branch, 496 F. Supp. 2d 757, 774-76 (N.D. Tex. 2007)
(issuing preliminary injunction on basis that local ordinance is preempted by federal law because
it is a regulation of immigration, which the Constitution commits exclusively to the federal
government; further finding ordinance unconstitutionally vague and therefore void); Lozano v.
City of Hazleton, 496 F. Supp. 2d 477, 517-55 (M.D. Pa. 2007) (permanently enjoining
enforcement of local ordinance and finding it expressly preempted by federal law and violative of
procedural due process; also addressing other claims under state and federal law); Garrett v.
City of Escondido, 465 F. Supp. 2d 1043, 1054-59 (S.D. Cal. 2006) (finding local ordinance likely
preempted by federal law and a violation of procedural due process).
17. See supra note 16.
18. See, e.g., Motomura, supra note 6, at 1364 (endorsing federal exclusivity); Hiroshi
Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?: Citizens, Aliens, and the Constitution, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
1567, 1596-1601 (1997) (reviewing GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAw (1996)) (arguing that immigration authority

should rest exclusively at the federal level); Pham, supra note 9, at 1381 (arguing that
immigration authority is exclusively federal); Wishnie, supra note 7, at 530-31 (same). But see
Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 609-17 (challenging federal exclusivity); Schuck, supra note 11, at
57-92 (same, at least with respect to circumscribed areas).
19. Cf. Bradford R. Clark, Federal Common Law: A Structural Reinterpretation,144 U. PA.
L. REV. 1245, 1251-52, 1298 & n.252 (1996) (proposing a reconceptualization of federal common
law that rests upon an understanding that at least some federal common law stands upon firmer
constitutional ground because the rules are passed in areas of "structural preemption"-defined
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This Article challenges the structural preemption argument,
contending that the constitutional mandate for federal exclusivity over
pure immigration law is far more contestable than the traditional
debate would suggest. The text and structure of the Constitution allow
for shared authority. Until the late nineteenth century, states enacted
immigration laws, and nothing in Supreme Court precedent clearly
supports a claim of structural preemption.
How we understand the nature of federal power over pure
immigration law matters for at least two important reasons. First, it
is directly relevant to questions concerning the delegation of federal
authority and the existence of inherent state and local authority to
enforce immigration laws. Second, it is central to the broader question
of state and local authority to enact laws that affect non-citizens in the
United States. As explained below, 20 concluding that the Constitution
precludes state and local authority over pure immigration law casts a
long shadow on any state or local conduct concerning immigration,
even conduct that falls short of pure immigration law. With an
understanding that authority over pure immigration law is shared
among levels of government, state and local involvement in
immigration is far less suspect, and it becomes possible to engage in a
more nuanced debate over the proper allocation of authority.
In most areas of governmental action, core debates about
federalism inform our understanding of the respective roles of the
national and subnational governments. The proposition that the
Constitution has committed immigration authority exclusively to the
federal government, however, takes immigration out of such debates.
Thus, the structural preemption view of federal exclusivity renders
conventional federalism debates irrelevant, or at least not particularly
resonant.
Rejecting structural preemption as the basis for federal
dominance in immigration, this Article argues that immigration is
more like areas of constitutional law that involve a mix of federal and
state authority. To be sure, the Supremacy Clause gives the federal
government the authority to preempt state and local conduct. 2 1 But
this statutory preemption differs fundamentally from a rule of
structural preemption, which reserves little, if any, role for state and
local governments.
as situations where the structure and relationships created by the Constitution remove certain
subjects from "the legislative competence of the states").
20. See infra Parts II.C, IV.
21. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, § 2 ("This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof.., shall be the supreme Law of the Land ... any
Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.").
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Once it is clear that the Constitution allows a role for
subnational polities in immigration, the conventional and contested
values of federalism become operable. There is much to be learned
from subjecting state and local regulation of immigration to federalism
debates. These debates are centrally concerned with questions that
are directly relevant to immigration federalism, such as balancing
uniformity with experimentalism and participation with parochialism.
The values of federalism thus have a productive role to play in the
immigration debate by providing varied approaches to immigrationrelated matters, and the different experiences of subnational
governments will help to elucidate the larger questions of how best to
formulate a national immigration policy. Additionally, classic
federalism arguments provide tools that allow us to balance competing
interests and determine the appropriate allocation of authority among
levels of government.
Continued adherence to structural preemption obscures the
robust role that all levels of government play in the regulation of
immigration. 22 And from a theoretical perspective, it denies the
benefits of analyzing the practice through the larger federalism
conversation. Debates over federalism draw on a rich mine of
competing values, and the controversy over state and local
involvement in immigration would benefit from the debate concerning
these values. In short, assessing state and local involvement through a
federalism lens provides much-needed evaluative and normative tools.
Bringing immigration into the constitutional mainstream
would not mean that all state and local regulation is constitutionally
permissible. Where the line should be drawn, for example, between
the need for uniformity and an interest in fostering experimentalism
is far from obvious. 23 But structural preemption denies the basic
relevance of the question.
Further, focusing on the values of federalism does not mean
that individual rights are unimportant. The Constitution is centrally
concerned with structural issues-the relationships among the
branches of the national government and between the national and
subnational governments-and individual rights. The arguments in
this Article primarily address issues of structure and the allocation of
authority. As discussed below, 24 this allocation can be informed by
22. See Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 576-609 (describing this role).
23. Additionally, as noted at various points throughout this Article, see, e.g., infra text
accompanying note 90, if the federal government concludes that certain state and local
regulation runs afoul of national interests and it wishes to prevent such action, statutory
preemption is always available to the federal government.
24. See infra Part III.C.
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assessing which level of government will best protect individual
rights. Federalism and individual rights, however, are fundamentally
different issues. Immigration scholars tend to concentrate on
questions of individual rights, not structural issues, 25 leaving a gap in
our understanding of the Constitution's commitments regarding
immigration. This Article begins to fill this gap by unpacking the
structural issues related to immigration.
To these multiple ends, Part I of this Article begins with a
description of the current dominance of federal authority over
immigration. It then explains the recent reemergence of immigration
federalism, describing the range and types of state and local
involvement in immigration matters. Finally, this Part offers several
reasons for this trend.
Part II challenges the claim that the authority to establish
pure immigration law-narrowly defined as the admission and
removal of non-citizens and not encompassing broader regulations
affecting non-citizens in the country-is constitutionally committed to
the federal government alone. This Part acknowledges that federal
exclusivity is an accurate description of immigration law but
challenges the constitutional basis for this federal exclusivity. It
identifies three types of preemption-structural, statutory, and
dormant-and argues that, although conventional wisdom embraces a
structural preemption view of federal immigration authority, the text
of the Constitution, the institutions created by the Constitution, and
historical practice all support a statutory preemption view. This Part
also examines Supreme Court decisions, arguing that Supreme Court
precedent does not foreclose a statutory preemption view of federal
authority. This Part concludes with a brief explanation of why the
constitutional underpinnings of federal exclusivity matter.
With a view of shared authority firmly in place, Part III
explores how difficult questions posed by state and local involvement
can be assessed through a federalism lens. This Part first identifies
the values associated with federalism and then examines those values
in the context of immigration. This examination demonstrates the
considerable analytical benefit of assessing state and local conduct
through a federalism lens. This Part also addresses questions of
individual rights and sets forth a series of questions for further
exploration.
Part IV explores the implications of the statutory preemption
view of federal exclusivity. It examines how a statutory preemption
25. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 7, at 504-09 (discussing Supreme Court decisions applying
equal protection analysis to immigration issues).
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view deeply affects our understanding of the constitutionality of the
three central types of state and local involvement in immigration: the
delegation of federal immigration authority, the state and local
enforcement of federal immigration laws in the absence of a
delegation, and the enactment by state and local governments of laws
that affect non-citizens. This Part also demonstrates the value of the
federalism lens by applying it to these difficult questions.
This Article thus establishes a new approach to immigration
federalism. It demonstrates that a federalism lens is a particularly
fine tool for determining the proper allocation of immigration
authority among levels of government and is vastly superior to the
blunt tool of structural preemption. Using a federalism lens, courts,
policymakers, and legal scholars can begin to engage in a far more
productive debate about immigration federalism.
I. STATES, LOCALITIES, AND IMMIGRATION

For more than a hundred years, the federal government has
been the dominant force in immigration. Recently, states and localities
have begun to assert an increasingly important and visible role in this
field. This Part describes the respective roles of the various levels of
government today. This description is an essential backdrop for
understanding the theoretical and normative arguments concerning
immigration federalism discussed later in the Article.
A. The Legal Backdrop: FederalDominance
Immigration law traditionally has been understood to
encompass the rules governing the admission and removal of noncitizens. 26 For more than a hundred years, immigration law in this
narrow sense has been almost exclusively federal with no, or only a
limited, role for state and local governments. 27 A complex federal law,
the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 28 sets forth the terms of
admission of non-citizens as well as the circumstances under which

26. See Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419 (1948) (defining immigration
law to concern "what aliens shall be admitted to the United States, the period they may remain,
regulation of their conduct before naturalization, and the terms and conditions of their
naturalization").
27. See infra note 175 (describing how federal law takes cognizance of state laws regarding,
for example, marriage and criminal convictions).
28. See Immigration and Nationality Act, Pub. L. No. 82-414, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.).
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non-citizens will be removed from the country.2 9 Today, states and
localities play no direct role in establishing what this Article terms
"pure" immigration law.
A separate body of law, commonly thought of as alienage law,
determines the rights and obligations of non-citizens while in the
country. When the federal government enacts alienage laws, courts
subject the laws to rational basis review. 30 By contrast, although
29. When the political branches of the federal government enact and enforce immigration
laws, they receive wide latitude from the judiciary. Under the plenary power doctrine, courts are
reluctant to hear constitutional challenges regarding the laws governing the admission and
removal of non-citizens. See, e.g., Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration Law After a Century of
Plenary Power: Phantom ConstitutionalNorms and Statutory Interpretation, 100 YALE L.J. 545,
550-60 (1990) (describing plenary power doctrine and relevant cases). The plenary power
doctrine has long been the subject of criticism, see, e.g., Gabriel J. Chin, Segregation's Last
Stronghold: Race Discriminationand the Constitutional Law of Immigration, 46 UCLA L. REV.
1, 6-7 (1998) (arguing that the doctrine allows racial discrimination in immigration law), and
some scholars doubt its continuing vitality, see, e.g., Motomura, supra, at 564-75 (arguing that
the Supreme Court has undermined the plenary power doctrine by rendering "subconstitutional"
decisions in statutory interpretation cases); Peter J. Spiro, Explaining the End of Plenary Power,
16 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 339, 339-41 (2002) (explaining how two Supreme Court decisions "point the
way to the abandonment of plenary power"). Of course, the idea that decision-making by the
political branches is insulated from judicial review does not necessarily mean the political
branches are free from constitutional constraint. See Cornelia T.L. Pillard & T. Alexander
Aleinikoff, Skeptical Scrutiny of Plenary Power: Judicialand Executive Branch Decision Making
in Miller v. Albright, 1998 Sup. CT. REV. 1, 32-40 (arguing that the plenary power doctrine is
best understood as a doctrine of "institutional deference" in the immigration context, with the
Court underenforcing constitutional norms, not announcing a separate set of substantive norms);
Lawrence Gene Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced ConstitutionalNorms,
91 HARV. L. REV. 1212, 1218-20 (1978) (discussing underenforced constitutional norms). Whether
the political branches can, in fact, be relied upon to restrain themselves, however, is another
question. See generally Cornelia T.L. Pillard, The Unfulfilled Promise of the Constitution in
Executive Hands, 103 MICH. L. REV. 676 (2005) (arguing that the "actual practices" of the
political branches, and particularly the executive branch, raise serious doubts as to the claim
that the executive branch can provide an independent assessment of constitutional obligations).
An interesting question that need not be resolved in this Article is whether a state or local
pure immigration law would receive the same level of deference. This case is unlikely to come
before the Supreme Court because of the federal dominance in pure immigration law, but, in
light of the arguments I advance in this Article, arguably such enactments also should enjoy
similar judicial deference. In other words, if the Constitution permits all levels of government to
enact pure immigration law, then all enactments should receive judicial deference. On the other
hand, as I elaborate below, state and local authority over pure immigration law is premised on
state and local authority over matters of local concern, not foreign affairs. And the relationship
between immigration and foreign affairs is one of the main justifications for judicial deference.
30. See Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 79-80 (1976) (finding no violation of the Equal
Protection Clause in federal rule that limited Medicare to citizens, and stating that "[iun the
exercise of its broad power over naturalization and immigration, Congress regularly makes rules
that would be unacceptable if applied to citizens"); id. at 85 ("Insofar as state welfare policy is
concerned, there is little, if any, basis for treating persons who are citizens of another State
differently from persons who are citizens of another country. Both groups are non-citizens as far
as the State's interests in administering its welfare programs are concerned. Thus, a division by
a State of the category of persons who are not citizens of that State into subcategories of United
States citizens and aliens has no apparent justification, whereas, a comparable classification by
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states and localities have some authority to enact alienage laws, 3'
when they use this authority to restrict economic benefits provided to
non-citizens lawfully in the country, courts usually subject the laws to
strict scrutiny review.32 Strict scrutiny does not attach to all state and
local alienage laws. For example, in Plyler v. Doe, the Supreme Court
rejected the claim that unauthorized migrants are a suspect class,
even as to state laws. 33 The Court also has found strict scrutiny
inappropriate in reviewing state laws concerning membership in the
political community.3 4 Apart from Equal Protection claims, courts
often find state and local alienage laws to be preempted by federal
law. 3 5 The precise nature of this preemption is discussed below. 36

the Federal Government is a routine and normally legitimate part of its business."); see also
Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage, 91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1645
(2007) ("When Congress has denied benefits to aliens that it grants to citizens, it has had to
justify its denial by articulating an immigration purpose in order to avoid heightened scrutiny on
an equal protection challenge.").
31. For example, in a series of cases, the Court recognized the power of a state to restrict
the devolution of real property to non-citizens based on a state's broad authority to regulate real
property within its borders. See Frick v. Webb, 263 U.S. 326, 333-34 (1923) (noting that the
exercise of such power does not violate the Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment); Webb v. O'Brien, 263 U.S. 313, 321-22 (1923) (same); Porterfield v.
Webb, 263 U.S. 225, 232-33 (1923) (same); Terrace v. Thompson, 263 U.S. 197, 216-18 (1923)
(same). The Court also has broadly recognized state authority to regulate areas traditionally of
state concern, even when the regulation might touch upon immigration. See DeCanas v. Bica,
424 U.S. 351, 355-56 (1976) ("California has sought to strengthen its economy by adopting
federal standards in imposing criminal sanctions against state employers who knowingly employ
aliens who have no federal right to employment within the country; even if such local regulation
has some purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration, it does not thereby become a
constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration that Congress itself would be powerless to
authorize or approve. Thus, absent congressional action, § 2805 would not be an invalid state
incursion on federal power."); see also id. at 356 ("States possess broad authority under their
police powers to regulate the employment relationship to protect workers within the State. Child
labor laws, minimum and other wage laws, laws affecting occupational health and safety, and
workmen's compensation laws are only a few examples.").
32. See Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 371-72, 376 (1971) (finding alienage a suspect
class, prompting strict scrutiny of two states' discriminatory laws concerning economic benefits
for legal permanent residents); see also Takahashi v. Fish & Game Comm'n, 334 U.S. 410, 419-20
(1948) (finding state regulation limiting commercial fishing licenses to persons ineligible for
citizenship to violate Equal Protection); Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 43 (1915) (finding state
employment restrictions on immigrants to violate Equal Protection); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118
U.S. 356, 369-74 (1886) (finding Equal Protection to apply to non-citizens because the use of the
term "person" in the Fourteenth Amendment should be read literally to include all people within
the territory of the United States).
33. 457 U.S. 202, 219 n.19, 223 (1982).
34. Cabell v. Chavez-Salido, 454 U.S. 432, 438-39 (1982).
35. See, e.g., Toll v. Moreno, 458 U.S. 1, 17 (1982) (finding Maryland statute denying
children of certain non-citizens in-state tuition violated the Supremacy Clause because it
contradicted the federal government's determination that such non-citizens were permitted to
establish domicile after legal admittance into the country); Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 68-
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The categories of immigration law and alienage law are not
watertight. 37 In particular, the Court has not clearly embraced the
dual category approach, 38 and the two often overlap as a practical
matter. For example, alienage laws barring non-citizens from certain
public benefits likely affect immigration by discouraging some noncitizens from coming to the United States and encouraging others to
leave. 39 Conversely, immigration laws making the conviction of certain
crimes the basis for removal likely affect non-citizens' behavior while
40
they are in the country.
There is a similar blurring of immigration and alienage in the
relationship between the national and subnational governments.
Although state and local governments are understood to possess no
authority over immigration law, federal action or inaction with respect
to immigration can profoundly affect states and localities. Indeed,
recent state and local involvement often is attributed to the perceived
need to address unauthorized migration in the face of the federal
government's failure to do so. 4 1 This point has been bolstered by the
multiple suits brought by states seeking to require the federal
government to enforce federal immigration law, thus alleviating the
42
perceived burden of unauthorized migration on states and localities.

74 (1941) (finding Pennsylvania statute requiring aliens to register annually invalid and in
conflict with similar federal legislation).
36. See infra Part II.B.
37. See Linda Bosniak, Varieties of Citizenship, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2449, 2451-52 (2007).
Bosniak argues that the distinction between alienage and immigration law is highly problematic
and that the fight to categorize a regulation as one or the other carries tremendous weight, given
that the categorization greatly affects how the regulation will be treated. She further notes that
[u]nderstanding this interplay helps us to understand the push and pull of some of
our current debates over the status of immigrants, from drivers' licenses to disaster
relief to local police enforcement of immigration law. These debates are invariably
structured by disagreements over the legitimate scope of the national border as a
regulatory domain. At stake is the question of how far into the lives of aliens the
border can, and should extend.
Id.
38. See Wishnie, supra note 7, at 526 (discussing this distinction and noting that it is not
dispositive in case law).
39. See Hiroshi Motomura, Immigration and Alienage, Federalism and Proposition 187, 35
VA. J. INT'L L. 201, 203 (1994) (arguing that a distinction between immigration law and alien law
is "more formal than real" because of the overlap in practice).
40. See id.
41. See infra text accompanying notes 60, 71.
42. In the mid-1990s, six states sued the federal government seeking reimbursement for
state expenses incurred in providing services to unauthorized migrants and seeking to require
the federal government to enforce federal immigration laws. Each suit was dismissed. See Texas
v. United States, No. B-94-228 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 7, 1995), affd 106 F.3d 661 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing
a lack of judicial authority to review plaintiffs claims); New Jersey v. United States, No. 94-CV03471 (D.N.J. Aug. 3, 1995), affd 91 F.3d 463 (3d Cir. 1996) (dismissing the claim as a
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The line between immigration law and alienage law is
important in reinforcing the notion that the Constitution grants sole
authority to determine the content of pure immigration law to the
federal government-a notion contested below-while leaving some
room for state and local conduct falling short of pure immigration
law. 43 Put differently, the distinction clarifies, consistent with the
structural preemption view of federal exclusivity, that the federal
government alone controls immigration law, whereas states and
localities may play at least some role, consistent with the Equal
Protection Clause, in the regulation of non-citizens once they are in
the country.
B. The Current Resurgence of State and Local Regulation
Since the mid-1990s and particularly since the terrorist attacks
of September 11, 2001, state and local involvement in immigrationrelated matters has been on the rise. 44 This involvement falls into
three basic categories: the delegation of federal immigration authority,
the state and local enforcement of federal laws in the absence of a
delegation, and the enactment of state or local laws that affect noncitizens.
Federal delegation. Federal law delegates immigration
authority to states and localities in two notable provisions, both
enacted in 1996. In the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996, Congress enacted a new section 287(g) of
the INA. 45 Section 287(g) authorizes the Secretary of Homeland
nonjusticiable political question); Arizona v. United States, No. 94-0866 (D. Ariz. Apr. 18, 1995),
aff'd 104 F.3d 1095 (9th Cir. 1997) (relying on the reasoning in California v. United States, 104
F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997)); Padavan v. United States, No. 94-CV-1341 (N.D.N.Y. Apr. 18, 1995),
aff'd 82 F.3d 23 (2d Cir. 1996) (finding no case law, constitutional, or statutory support for
plaintiffs complaint); California v. United States, No. 94-0674-K (S.D. Cal. Mar. 3, 1995), aff'd
104 F.3d 1086 (9th Cir. 1997) (dismissing due to lack of authority to review agency actions and
failure to state a Tenth Amendment cause of action); Chiles v. United States, 874 F. Supp. 1334
(S.D. Fla. 1994), aff'd 69 F.3d 1094 (11th Cir. 1995) (dismissing the claim as a nonjusticiable
political question). In November 2006, voters in the state of Colorado approved a referendum
requiring the state to file suit against the United States to demand enforcement of federal
immigration laws. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-19.8-101 (2006). That suit was dismissed as well.
See Suthers v. Gonzales, No. 07-cv-00478-LTB-MJW, 2007 WL 2788603 (D. Colo. Sept. 21, 2007)
(dismissing the claim for numerous reasons, including lack of jurisdiction because the claim
presented a nonjusticiable political question).
43. See infra Part II.A.
44.

See NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, supra note 5, at 1 (describing increase

in rate of state laws: in 2007, over 1500 pieces of legislation were introduced and 240 were
enacted, nearly triple the number of similar laws enacted in 2006).
45. Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104208, § 133, 110 Stat. 3009 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1357(g) (2000)).
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Security to enter into agreements with state and local governments to
enforce federal immigration law. 46 The delegated authority includes
the power to arrest and detain non-citizens for immigration violations,
investigate immigration violations, and collect evidence and prepare
47
immigration cases to be brought before an immigration judge.
Although the number is in flux, 48 several states and localities have
entered into such agreements with the federal government. 49 The
agreements typically set forth training requirements for state and
local officers and provide for some oversight by federal immigration
50
officials.
A similar cooperation provision is found in the administration
of federal benefit programs. In the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 ("PRWORA"), Congress
authorized states to determine immigrant eligibility for specified
federal benefit programs, including Medicaid and Temporary
Assistance to Needy Families. 51 Without this federal authorization, a
state law hinging eligibility for state benefits on immigration status
would be subject to strict scrutiny, at least with respect to non-citizens

46. Id. Specifically, section 287(g) provides that
The [Secretary of Homeland Security] may enter into a written agreement with a
State, or any political subdivision of a State, pursuant to which an officer or employee
of the State or subdivision, who is determined by the [Secretary] to be qualified to
perform a function of an immigration officer in relation to the investigation,
apprehension, or detention of aliens in the United States (including the
transportation of such aliens across State lines to detention centers), may carry out
such function at the expense of the State or political subdivision and to the extent
consistent with State and local law.
Id.
47. See 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)-(d) (enumerating the powers of immigration officers and
employees).
48. Compare Katie Zezima, Massachusetts Set for Its Officers to Enforce Immigration Law,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 2006, at A24 (describing outgoing Massachusetts Governor Mitt Romney's
agreement with the federal government under section 287(g), but anticipating that incoming
governor, Deval Patrick, might revoke the agreement), with Katie Zezima, Massachusetts
Rescinds Deal on Policing Immigration, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 12, 2007, at A17 [hereinafter Zezima,
Massachusetts Rescinds Deal] ("Gov. Deval L. Patrick said Thursday that as expected, he had
rescinded a new agreement between Massachusetts and federal officials that empowered the
state police to arrest illegal immigrants on charges of violating immigration law.").
49. See Fact Sheet, supra note 4, at 2 (stating that Florida, Alabama, and agencies in
Arizona, North Carolina, and California have entered into 287(g) agreements); see also Kobach,
supra note 10, at 197 (noting that Florida became the first state to enter into such an agreement,
effective July 7, 2002).
50. See, e.g., Kobach, supra note 10, at 198.
51. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act ("PRWORA") of
1996, Pub. L. No. 107-171, §§ 571-77, 116 Stat. 134 (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1612(b)(1))
(authorizing states to determine eligibility of certain immigrants for specified federal benefit
programs, including Medicaid and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families).
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who are lawfully in the country. 52 The constitutionality of this kind of
delegation, however, remains contested. Courts have reached
conflicting conclusions on the level of review applicable to such
federally authorized state eligibility requirements, with some courts
53
finding that strict scrutiny applies even with the federal delegation.
Inherent enforcement authority in the absence of delegation.
Some states and localities have asserted a role in the enforcement of
federal immigration regulations even without a delegation of federal
authority. The legal authority for such enforcement has been analyzed
by the Department of Justice's Office of Legal Counsel ("OLC"). 54 The
subject of considerable controversy, 55 the OLC opinion found that
states and localities possess inherent authority to enforce both the
criminal and civil provisions of the INA. 56 The OLC opinion
contemplated assistance in the form of state or local law enforcement
officials arresting non-citizens and delivering them to federal officials.
The authority recognized in the OLC opinion contrasts to the

52. See supraPart I.A.
53. Compare Aliessa v. Novello, 754 N.E.2d 1085, 1098-99 (N.Y. 2001) (finding New York
eligibility provision authorized by PRWORA to be subject to strict scrutiny because Congress
cannot authorize the states to discriminate between non-citizens and citizens, and therefore
striking down the provision as a violation of Equal Protection), with Soskin v. Reinertson, 257 F.
Supp. 2d 1320, 1325-27 (D. Colo. 2003) (finding state law determining non-citizen eligibility
pursuant to PRWORA subject to rational basis review because the provision was sanctioned by
federal law and the program was dually funded by both the federal and state governments, and
thus distinct from the state-only program in Aliessa).
54. See Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel,
to the Attorney General, Non-preemption of the Authority of State and Local Law Enforcement
Officials to Arrest Aliens for Immigration Violations 7-8 (Apr. 3, 2002) [hereinafter OLC
Opinion], http://www.aclu.org/FilesPDFs/ACF27DA.pdf (withdrawing "the 1996 OLC Opinion's
advice that federal law precludes state police from arresting aliens on the basis of civil
deportability"). In the interest of full disclosure, I note that I worked on the opinion when I was
an attorney-advisor in the Office of Legal Counsel.
55. See Eric Schmitt, Administration Split on Local Role in Terror Fight, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
29, 2002, at Al (describing conflict, including the White House's disagreement with the opinion);
Eric Schmitt, Two Conservatives Tell Bush They Oppose Plan for Police, N.Y. TIMES, June 2,
2002, at A24 ("Two leading conservatives have joined a chorus of police officials and immigrant
rights advocates in opposing a Justice Department proposal to allow state and local law
enforcement agencies to track down illegal immigrants as a way to fight terrorism."). Several
groups, including La Raza and the ACLU, successfully sued the Department of Justice to disclose
its 2002 OLC Opinion. Nat'l Council of La Raza v. Dep't of Justice, 411 F.3d 350, 352 (2d Cir.
2005) (affirming district court order to disclose OLC memorandum); see supra note 54.
56. See OLC Opinion, supra note 54, at 2-4 (finding that "such arrest authority inheres in
the States' status as sovereign entities"). This opinion reversed an earlier OLC opinion finding
that states and localities could enforce only the criminal provisions. See Assistance by State and
Local Police in Apprehending Illegal Aliens, 20 Op. Off. Legal Counsel 26, 32 (1996) (finding
"that state and local police lack recognized legal authority to stop and detain an alien solely on
suspicion of civil deportability, as opposed to a criminal violation of the immigration laws or
other laws").
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authority contemplated by section 287(g) in that the state or local
officer is drawing on inherent state or local authority, not delegated
federal authority, to make the arrest. Further, the action by the state
or local officer is more limited than the kind of enforcement
undertaken pursuant to section 287(g), which includes, for example,
the authority to prepare removal cases in anticipation of a hearing
before an immigration judge.
Although some states use their inherent authority to enforce
forbid
federal immigration law, other states restrict and, at times,
58
such enforcement. 57 This is true of local governments as well.
Immigration-related lawmaking. States and localities are
enacting laws that seek to influence non-citizens and immigration.
Arizona has enacted the most far-reaching law-the Legal Arizona
Workers Act-which imposes heavy penalties, including the loss of an
operating license, on businesses that intentionally or knowingly hire
unauthorized migrants. 59 When she signed the law in July 2007, the
Democratic governor contended that Arizona had to take some action
in light of the federal government's failure to curb unauthorized
migration. 60 Some localities also have enacted laws that discourage
57. For example, Alaska, Maine, New Mexico, Oregon, and the District of Columbia have
policies restricting local law enforcement of federal immigration law. OR. REV. STAT. § 181.850(1)
(2005); H.J. Res. 22, 23rd Leg., 1st Sess. (Alaska 2003); Governor of New Mexico, Bill
Richardson, Exec. Order No. 2005-019, Clarifying Victim and Witness Protections in New Mexico
(Apr. 7, 2005); Governor of Maine, John E. Balducci, Exec. Order, An Order Concerning Access to
State Services By All Entitled Maine Residents (Apr. 9, 2004) (as slightly modified by Governor
of Maine, John E. Balducci, Exec. Order, An Order Amending the Order Concerning Access to
State Services By All Entitled Maine Residents (Feb. 25, 2005)); Mayor's Memorandum 84-41
(D.C. 2003).
58. Counties in California and North Carolina have entered into section 287(g) agreements
with the federal government, see Fact Sheet, supra note 4, at 2, whereas San Francisco, Detroit,
and numerous other cities have enacted laws prohibiting such enforcement, see NAT'L
IMMIGRATION LAW CTR., LAWS, RESOLUTIONS AND POLICIES INSTITUTED ACROSS THE U.S.
LIMITING ENFORCEMENT OF IMMIGRATION LAWS BY STATE AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES (2007),

http://www.nilc.org/immlawpolicy/LocalLaw/locallaw_limitingtbl_2007-10-11.pdf.
59. H.B. 2779, 48th Leg., 1st Reg. Sess., 2007 Ariz. Sess. Laws. 279 (codified in scattered
sections, including ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 23-212 (LexisNexis 2007)).
60. The governor's transmittal letter stated that "[i]mmigration is a federal responsibility,
but I signed House Bill 2779 because it is now abundantly clear that Congress finds itself
incapable of coping with the comprehensive immigration reforms our country needs." Letter from
Janet Napolitano, Governor of Ariz., to Jim Weiers, Speaker of the House, Ariz. House of
http://azgovernor.gov/dms/upload/NR_0702072007),
2,
(July
Representatives
HB%202779%2OStatement.pdf. The letter went on to say:
Because of Congress' failure to act, states like Arizona have no choice but to take
strong action to discourage the further flow of illegal immigration through our
borders. I renew my call to Congress to enact comprehensive immigration reform
legislation. Now that Arizona has acted, other states are likely to follow. For our
country to have a uniform and uniformly enforced immigration law, the United States
Congress must act swiftly and definitively to solve this problem at the national level.
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the presence of unauthorized migrants. For example, localities in
California, Georgia, and Texas have passed ordinances that prohibit
landlords from renting premises to non-citizens unlawfully in the
United States. 61 Other local ordinances sweep more broadly,
prohibiting businesses from "knowingly... aiding and abetting illegal
aliens," including the employment of unauthorized migrants and the
provision of goods and services to a day labor center that does not
verify the status of all clients. 62 Finally, some states have incorporated
immigration-related violations into their own penal codes by, for
example, imposing criminal sanctions for transporting unauthorized
63
migrants.
In contrast to these more punitive measures, some states and
localities have enacted laws that benefit non-citizens, including
unauthorized migrants. 64 For example, numerous states currently

Id.
61. See Farmers Branch, Tex., Ordinance 2903 (May 12, 2007) ("The owner and/or property
manager shall require as a prerequisite to entering into any lease or rental arrangement,
including any lease or rental renewals or extensions, the submission of evidence of citizenship or
eligible immigration status for each tenant family ..
"); Cherokee County, Ga., Ordinance 2006003 (Dec. 5, 2006) (stating that "to let, lease, or rent" or "suffer or permit the occupancy" of a
dwelling unit by an "illegal alien" is prohibited and "shall be deemed to constitute harboring");
Escondido, Cal., Ordinance 2006-38 R § 3 (Oct. 18, 2006) (declaring it unlawful for the owner of a
dwelling unit to "harbor" an "illegal alien," and defining "harboring" as "to let, lease, or rent a
dwelling unit to an illegal alien" or "[t]o suffer or permit the occupancy of the dwelling unit by an
illegal alien"). These laws are not faring well. As noted above, the Farmers' Branch ordinance
has been temporarily enjoined, see supra note 1; similarly, the Escondido ordinance has been
preempted by state law, see CAL. CIV. CODE § 1940.3 (West 2007) (effective Jan. 1, 2008)
(prohibiting local governments from passing laws requiring landlords to monitor tenants'
immigration status), after it, too, was temporarily enjoined, Garrett v. Escondido, 465 F. Supp.
2d 1043, 1060 (S.D. Cal. 2006).
62. See Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-40 (Dec. 26, 2006) ("Illegal Immigration Relief Act
Implementation Amendment"--amending Ordinance 2006-18 by adding § 7, "Implementation
and Process"); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-18 (Sept. 8, 2006) ("City of Hazleton Illegal
Immigration Relief Act Ordinance" as amended); Hazleton, Pa., Ordinance 2006-13 (Aug. 15,
2006) (Tenant Registration Program ordinance). The Hazleton ordinances are the subject of
current litigation. See supra notes 15-16 and accompanying text. Importantly, some state
measures limiting eligibility for public benefits are sanctioned by the federal government in the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1996, which authorized states to establish
their own non-citizen eligibility criteria for specified public benefits. See supra text
accompanying note 51.
63. E.g., Oklahoma Taxpayer and Citizen Protection Act of 2007, H.B. 1804, 51st Leg., 1st
Sess. § 3 (Okla. 2007) (codified at OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 446 (effective Nov. 1, 2007)); see also
COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-13-127(b)(3) (2007) (forbidding trafficking in persons and upgrading the
offense for trafficking in adults who "are illegally present in the United States").
64. On this point in general, see Peter H. Schuck, Some Federal-State Developments in
Immigration Law, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 387, 389-90 (2002) (noting that the anticipated
"race to the bottom" has not occurred and instead numerous states, including those with large
immigrant populations, have restored benefits on the state level that had been lost at the federal
level, in some instances providing new benefits, including Medicaid). But see Daniel C. Vock,
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provide in-state tuition rates for some unauthorized migrants
attending state universities. 65 New York offers health care for
unauthorized migrants without health insurance who are diagnosed
with cancer, 66 and New Haven and San Francisco have issued
municipal identification cards to all residents, regardless of
immigration status, to ensure that residents have access to local
services and to "help overcome reluctance to report crimes." 67 Further,
as with the states and localities that refuse to cooperate with federal
efforts to enforce immigration laws, Illinois enacted a law forbidding
businesses from using a federal database to verify the immigration
68
status of potential employees.

With Feds Stuck, States Take on Immigration, STATELINE.ORG,
Dec. 13, 2007,
http://www.stateline.org/live/details/story?contentId=264483 (noting that "laws restricting the
rights or benefits of illegal immigrants outnumbered laws benefiting them by a 2-1 ratio").
65. New Mexico has the most generous law, providing that "[any tuition rate or statefunded financial aid that is granted to residents of New Mexico shall also be granted on the same
terms to all persons, regardless of immigration status." N.M. STAT. ANN. § 21-1-4.6(B) (West
2007). Other states extend in-state tuition to unauthorized migrants with minor conditions
attached. See CAL. EDUC. CODE § 68130.5(a)(4) (West 2007) (providing an exemption from
nonresident tuition for unauthorized migrant students who swear by affidavit that they have
applied for legal immigrant status or will do so as soon as eligible); 110 ILL. COMP. STAT. §§
305/7e-5(a)(5), 520/8d-5(a)(5) (2008) (same, although not specifying that the rule applies to
unauthorized migrants and instead appears to apply to anyone who is not a citizen or legal
permanent resident); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 76-731a(b)(2)(C) (2006) (similar rule as in California);
N.Y. EDUC. LAW §§ 355(2)(h)(8), 6206(7)(a) (Consol. 2007) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 70, §
3242(B)(2) (West 2007) (same); TEX. EDUC. CODE ANN. §§ 54.052, 54.053(3)(B) (same); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 53B-8-106(2) (West 2007) (same); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 28B.15.012(2)(e) (West
2004) (same); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 36.27(2)(a)(6) (West 2007) (allowing length of time in state
requirements to be met by intermittent work in the state). Nebraska has the strictest rule. See
NEB. REV. STAT. § 85-502(5) (2007) (requiring proof of prior application for legal immigration
status).
66. See Sarah Kershaw, New York, Faulting U.S., Says It Will Pay for Cancer Care for
Illegal Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at B3 ("Federal health officials have told New
York State that they will no longer help cover the cost of chemotherapy for illegal immigrants
with cancer because it does not qualify under an emergency Medicaid program. But yesterday,
state health officials said they would cover all the costs no matter what the federal government
does.").
67. See Community Services, New Haven's Elm City Resident Cards-Fact Sheet,
http://cityofnewhaven.comlpdf_whatsnew/ municipalidfactsheet.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2008)
("Providing residents who otherwise have no proof of ID with a municipal identification card will
help overcome reluctance to report crimes they may suffer or witness and also provide
identification to law enforcement and other officers if required."); S.F., Cal., Ordinance 274-07
(Nov. 20, 2007), available at http://www.sfgov.org/site/ bdsupvrs-page.asp?id=73995,
(authorizing County Clerk to issue municipal identification cards upon request to residents).
68. See 820 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 55/12 (LexisNexis 2008) (prohibiting employers from
"enrolling in any Employment Eligibility Verification System, including the Basic Pilot program"
until the Social Security Administration and Department of Homeland Security "are able to
make a determination on 99% of the tentative nonconfirmation notices issued to employers
within 3 days"). The federal government has challenged this law as statutorily preempted. See
Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Seeks to Invalidate Illinois Law Flouting
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In all three categories and for a variety of reasons, state and
local involvement in immigration is on the rise. 69 The heightened
political salience of unauthorized migration is one factor that has led
to increased state and local action. Because the cost of unauthorized
migration is perceived to be spread unevenly across levels of
government, 70 subnational lawmakers have expressed frustration with
enforcement failures at the national level and thus see a need to take
their own action. 71 In addition to enacting laws that discourage
Federal Immigration Efforts (Sept. 24, 2007), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2007/
September/07civ_757.html ("Today's lawsuit seeks to invalidate an Illinois state law that
frustrates our ability to assist employers in making sure their workforce is legal, and in doing so
conflicts with federal law.").
69. For example, although section 287(g) agreements have been possible since 1996, no
state had entered into an agreement with the federal government until after September 11,
2001. See U.S. Immigration & Customs Enforcement, Partners, http://www.ice.gov/partners/287g/
Section287g.htm (last visited Feb. 10, 2008) (describing the process for developing a law
enforcement partnership). Since September 11, 2001, Florida, Alabama, and agencies in Arizona,
North Carolina, and California have entered into such agreements. See Fact Sheet, supra note 4,
at 2; see also Kobach, supra note 10, at 180-82 (describing the various steps federal
administrators have taken as a result of September 11, 2001, to encourage greater local
involvement in the enforcement of immigration policy). Similarly, local law enforcement
"sanctuary policies," which specify that officers should refrain from asking questions or acting in
a way that may contribute to an unauthorized alien's removal from their locality, also have been
on the rise since September 11, 2001. Kittrie, supra note 3, at 1455.
70. There are two issues at play: the net economic impact of immigration and the
distribution of that impact. Addressing the second issue, conventional wisdom maintains that
there is a "large and systematic mismatch ... between the revenues that immigrants generate
for [the federal] government and the expenditures that [state] governments make on behalf of
immigrants." Schuck, supra note 64, at 390. Addressing both issues, a study conducted by the
University of Arizona found that immigrants (defined as all foreign-born individuals, regardless
of status, including naturalized citizens) produce a net economic benefit within Arizona. See
JUDITH GANS, UDALL CTR. FOR STUDIES IN PUB. POLICY, UNIV. OF ARIZ., IMMIGRANTS IN ARIZONA:
FISCAL AND ECONOMIC IMPACTS 3-6 (2007), http://udallcenter.arizona.edu/programs/immigration

/publications/immigrants inarizona.pdf (finding net fiscal impact of immigrants in 2004
positive, with tax revenues equaling $2.4 billion and fiscal costs totaling $1.4 billion; further
finding $44 billion in total economic output attributable to immigrants). The study did not
separately address the economic costs and benefits of unauthorized migration, but it did note
that the majority of immigrants in Arizona were there unlawfully (an estimated 450,000 to
500,000 of the total 830,900 foreign-born population), that these individuals were largely of
working age, and that they were primarily low-skilled workers, filling an important economic
niche in Arizona's economy. See id. at 61. For further discussion of this issue, particularly for
sources finding a negative fiscal and economic impact, see infra note 126.
71. See, e.g., Ralph Blumenthal, Texas Lawmakers Put New Focus on Illegal Immigration,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2006, at A22 (quoting Texas State Representative Burt R. Solomons as
saying that the surge in Texas anti-immigrant laws is attributable to "[aibsolute frustration"
with the federal government's failure to "do what they're supposed to do" to control the border
with Mexico). Unauthorized migration itself has been fueled by larger forces such as federal
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unauthorized migrants from coming into the state or locality,
numerous states have sued the federal government seeking to recoup
costs allegedly associated with unauthorized migration and to require
72
the federal government to enforce current laws.
A second factor leading to increased state and local
involvement is the changing immigration patterns that have brought
non-citizens to new parts of the country, such as the Rocky Mountain
West and the southeast, and to suburban and rural areas. 73 In this
regard, it is notable that the more punitive immigration measures
often, although not always, are enacted in areas new to receiving
74
significant populations of non-citizens.
A third factor leading to increased state and local involvement
is the perceived connection between national security and
immigration.7 5 Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the
federal government has actively sought the law enforcement
76
assistance of states and localities.
subsidies for certain crops, particularly corn, which leads to the overproduction of those crops
followed by the sale of the excess in Mexico, a possibility facilitated by the North American Free
Trade Agreement. According to one article, this process has led to the unemployment of two
million Mexican farmers and agricultural workers, some portion of whom then come to the
United States unlawfully seeking work. See Michael Pollan, You Are What You Grow, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 22, 2007, § 6 (Magazine), at 15 ("The flow of immigrants north from Mexico since
Nafta is inextricably linked to the flow of American corn in the opposite direction, a flood of
subsidized grain that the Mexican government estimates has thrown two million Mexican
farmers and other agricultural workers off the land since the mid-90s.").
72. See supra note 42 (describing these lawsuits).
73. See CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, A DESCRIPTION OF THE IMMIGRANT POPULATION 8, 15 (2004),
available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/60xx/doc6O19/1 1-23-Immigrant.pdf (documenting threefold increase in immigrant population in North Carolina, Georgia, and Nevada and significant
increases in other states, including Arkansas, Utah, Tennessee, Nebraska, Colorado, Arizona,
and Kentucky); Comprehensive Immigration Reform: Impact of Immigration on States and
Localities:Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Citizenship, Refugees, Border Security,
and InternationalLaw of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 77-78 (2007) (statement of
Dr. Audrey Singer, Immigration Fellow, Brookings Institute) [hereinafter Comprehensive
Immigration
Reform
Hearing],
available
at
http://judiciary.house.gov/medial
pdfs/printers/110th135452.pdf (describing shift in immigrant presence from urban areas to
suburban and rural areas).
74. See Comprehensive Immigration Reform Hearing,supra note 73, at 75 (testimony of Dr.
Audrey Singer, Immigration Fellow, Brookings Institute). Even in states with a more significant
history of immigration, such as Arizona, the recent surge in immigration is notable. See GANS,
supranote 70, at 9 (describing a 200 percent increase in the population of non-citizens in Arizona
between 1990 and 2004, and noting that the number of unauthorized migrants approximately
doubled between 2002 and 2005, from between 250,000 and 350,000 to 500,000 individuals).
75. See Kobach, supra note 10, at 180-99 (discussing the value of local law enforcement to
effective immigration law and, therefore, to more effective national security).
76. See id. (identifying federal measures intended to engage state and local authorities in
enforcing immigration law); Sessions & Hayden, supra note 10, at 327-29 (arguing in favor of
state and local law enforcement participation in immigration law enforcement, particularly with
respect to identifying and apprehending "alien absconders").
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As noted, these varied examples of state and local involvement
in immigration-related matters have sparked significant scholarly and
popular debate. What this debate has lacked, however, is a thorough
assessment of the constitutional underpinnings of federal exclusivity.
II. THE CONSTITUTION AND FEDERAL EXCLUSIVITY
The constitutionality of state and local involvement in
immigration-related matters turns on the question of federal
exclusivity with respect to pure immigration law-the narrow
category of rules governing the admission and removal of non-citizens.
As a descriptive matter, the federal government alone defines the
content of this narrow category. But this positive description does not
answer the underlying question whether the Constitution requires
such federal exclusivity. This Part establishes that there is no such
constitutional mandate.
The following discussion addresses federal exclusivity over
immigration law as narrowly defined. The recent involvement of
states and localities falls short of pure immigration law. 77 But how we
understand the nature of federal exclusivity over pure immigration
law informs our understanding of how careful we should be in
precluding states and localities from engaging in the conduct that they
have been undertaking. As discussed in Part IV, if the Constitution
allocates authority over pure immigration law solely to the federal
government, then we may be suspect of a delegation of that authority
and more reluctant to recognize inherent enforcement authority in
states and localities. Further, a constitutional mandate for federal
exclusivity over pure immigration law creates skepticism of state and
local regulations that fall short of pure immigration law. By contrast,
if immigration authority is viewed like other areas of regulation, then
the proper allocation of that authority can be assessed using the
traditional arguments of federalism. In short, how we understand the
nature of federal exclusivity over pure immigration law has
considerable consequences for assessing the constitutionality of
immigration federalism. For this reason, the following extended
discussion is needed, despite the absence of contemporary state and
local regulation of pure immigration law.

77. See supra Part I.B (describing "alienage" law, meaning laws concerning non-citizens in
the United States, and further describing the blurring of, and contested line between, the
categories).
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A. A Taxonomy of Preemption
For more than a century, the federal government has
dominated immigration law, preempting any role for state and local
governments. But the constitutional basis of this federal preemption is
unclear. There are three analytically distinct categories of preemption:
structural, dormant, and statutory.7 8 Determining which type of
preemption underlies federal exclusivity is essential to assessing the
constitutionality of immigration federalism.
In the first category, structural preemption, the Constitution
commits authority over a subject to the federal government alone,
foreclosing a role for states and localities. Structural preemption may
have a clear textual basis, such as the exclusive federal authority over
patent, 79 copyright,8 0 and bankruptcy,8 1 or it may draw on the
78. It is also true that in some instances the Constitution precludes a role for the federal
government and authorizes only state regulation. See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598,
618 (2000) ("The regulation and punishment of intrastate violence that is not directed at the
instrumentalities, channels, or goods involved in interstate commerce has always been the
province of the States."). This type of constitutional allocation of authority is not at issue here.
79. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by
securing, for limited Times to ... Inventors the exclusive Right to their... Discoveries .... "). In
an interesting parallel to this Article, despite what may appear to be a clear textual command for
structural preemption, a closer examination of patent and copyright law reveals a long struggle
to define the boundaries of federal versus state control. See EDWARD C. WALTERSCHEID, THE
NATURE OF THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY CLAUSE: A STUDY IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 435-76

(2002) (examining the relationship between federal and state government with respect to
intellectual property rights enforcement). According to Walterscheid, while the "states clearly
had power to issue patents and copyrights prior to the ratification of the Constitution," it was
unclear whether the federal Patent and Copyright Acts of 1790 and subsequent amendments
precluded states from continuing to do so. Id. at 468-69. In 1812, New York's Court for the
Correction of Errors, in dicta, indicated "that state and federal patent and copyright power were
concurrent, i.e., the grant of patent and copyright power to Congress in the intellectual property
clause was not exclusive." Id. at 469 (paraphrasing Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 507, 560
(N.Y. 1812)). The U.S. Supreme Court did not address this issue until more than one hundred
and fifty years later. In cases from 1964 through 1973, the Court seesawed between suggesting
federal preemption and foreclosing federal preemption. See id. at 470. Even after Congress, in
1976, revised copyright law to "broadly preempt[], with narrow exceptions, all state laws bearing
on material subject to federal copyright," id. at 472, the Court muddied the waters again in
Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141 (1989). Walterscheid observes that
"[ilf a fundamental purpose of the [intellectual property] clause is to promote uniformity with
regard to intellectual property, as the Court states [in Bonito], then it is unclear to what limited
extent, if any, the states retain any concurrent jurisdiction over patents and copyrights."
WALTERSCHEID, supra,at 472.

80.

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 ("To promote the Progress of Science ...

limited Times to Authors ...

the exclusive Right to their ...

Writings ....

by securing for

"). See discussion

supra note 79 (describing ambiguity of federal exclusivity for patent and copyright).
81. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 ('To establish.., uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States .... ). As with patent and copyright, there is also an
argument that federal authority over bankruptcy is concurrent with, and not exclusive of, state
authority. See Hanover Nat'l Bank v. Moyses, 186 U.S. 181 187-88 (1902) (stating that "the
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structure and relationships created by the Constitution.8 2 In the latter
case, the typical argument is that dual regulation of the topic would
raise such difficult governance issues that intergovernmental relations
must be structured to preclude any role for subnational
governments.8 3 The authority over foreign affairs traditionally is
understood to fall into this category.8 4 But there are dissenters on this
point, and a Supreme Court opinion suggests that states may play a
85
circumscribed role.
In the second category, dormant preemption, the Constitution
forbids subnational regulation on a certain topic, even absent federal
regulation, but permits regulation pursuant to federal authorization.
Importantly, when the federal government authorizes a state to
regulate in these areas, it is not delegating federal authority, but
instead is activating an underlying state authority. There are two

states, in surrendering the power, did so only if Congress chose to exercise it, but in the absence
of congressional legislation retained it").
82. See Clark, supra note 19, at 1251-52, 1298 & n.252 (describing structural preemption).
83. See, e.g., id. at 1298 & n.252 (discussing "structural preemption" of state law in the
context of foreign affairs); see also Gilbert v. Minnesota, 254 U.S. 325, 336-38 (1920) (Brandeis,
J., dissenting) (raising the argument, although not using this exact term, that structural
preemption precluded state regulation of speech bearing upon a national issue, such as World
War I).
84. See, e.g., Zschernig v. Miller, 389 U.S. 429, 432 (1968) (striking down state law, not
because it violated the Supremacy Clause or the prohibitions on state conduct in Article I,
Section 10, but rather because the law was "an intrusion by the state into the field of foreign
affairs which the Constitution entrusts to President and the Congress"); United States v. Pink,
315 U.S. 203, 233 (1942) ("Power over external affairs is not shared by the States; it is vested in
the national government exclusively."); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S. 324, 331 (1937) ("[I]n
respect of our foreign relations generally, state lines disappear. As to such purpose the state...
does not exist."); LOUIs HENKIN, FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION 150
(2d ed. 1996) ("At the end of the twentieth century as at the end of the eighteenth, as regards
U.S. foreign relations, the states 'do not exist."'); Lea Brilmayer, Federalism, State Authority,
and the Preemptive Power of InternationalLaw, 1994 SUP. CT. REV. 295, 304 ("Our Constitution
assigns to the federal government a virtual monopoly over international relations.").
85. See MICHAEL D. RAMSEY, THE CONSTITUTION'S TEXT IN FOREIGN AFFAIRS 264-82 (2007)
(arguing that the Framers did envision a role for the states in foreign affairs, as evidenced by the
prohibitions on state involvement in specified matters in Article I, Section 10, by the Tenth
Amendment, and by the Supremacy Clause, which, taken together, allow for at least some state
activity affecting foreign affairs); Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American Federalism,
97 MICH. L. REV. 390, 394 (1998) (arguing that there may be some federalism-based limitations
on the treaty power). But see David M. Golove, Treaty-Making and the Nation: The Historical
Foundations of the Nationalist Conception of the Treaty Power, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1075, 1279
(2000) (challenging this view). But see Curtis A. Bradley, The Treaty Power and American
Federalism,Part II, 99 MICH. L. REV. 98, 99 (2000) (rebutting the claims of Professor Golove). As
discussed below, the Supreme Court has acknowledged that states may be able to regulate
foreign affairs insofar as this is an incidental effect of regulation that otherwise falls within
traditional state competence. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2003).
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areas of constitutional law that reflect dormant preemption.8 6 Under
the Commerce Clause, states are prohibited from interfering with or
discriminating against interstate commerce,8 7 but pursuant to a
federal statutory grant of authority, states may do so. 8 8 Additionally,
the Compact Clause reflects this understanding: the Constitution
prohibits states from undertaking specified conduct absent a federal
grant of permission.8 9 Both the dormant Commerce Clause and the
Compact Clause involve congressional grants of permission to exercise
state authority that, but for the congressional approval, would be
contrary to the constitutional design.
In the third category, statutory preemption, the Constitution
permits the national and subnational levels of government to share
authority over a subject, but it also authorizes the national
government to preempt, through federal statute, a state or local role,
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. 90 As discussed below, depending
on the subject of regulation and, in particular, whether it is a subject
of traditional state competence, such as health and safety, Congress

86. Courts sometimes refer to a dormant foreign affairs preemption. See Nat'l Foreign
Trade Council v. Natsios, 181 F.3d 38, 52-55 (1st Cir. 1999) (finding state law preempted by
dormant foreign affairs power), vacated, Crosby v. Nat'l Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363,
374 n.8 (2000) (declining to reach dormant foreign affairs claim). As Jack Goldsmith argues,
"dormant preemption operates like statutory preemption without a statute." Jack L. Goldsmith,
Statutory Foreign Affairs Preemption, 2000 SUP. CT. REV. 175, 203-05. For an argument against
dormant foreign affairs preemption, see RAMSEY, supra note 85, at 275-82.
87. See Am. Trucking Ass'n v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 545 U.S. 429, 433 (2005) ("Our
Constitution was framed upon the theory that the peoples of the several states must sink or
swim together. Thus, this Court has consistently held that the Constitution's express grant to
Congress of the power to 'regulate Commerce... among the several States,' contains a further,
negative command, known as the dormant Commerce Clause, that creates an area of trade free
from interference by the States. This negative command prevents a State from jeopardizing the
welfare of the Nation as a whole by placing burdens on the flow of commerce across its borders
that commerce wholly within those borders would not bear." (internal citations and quotations
omitted)). For an excellent discussion of the dormant commerce clause and interstate relations
more broadly, see generally Gillian E. Metzger, Congress, Article IV, and Interstate Relations,
120 HARV. L. REV. 1468 (2007).
88. See New England Power Co. v. New Hampshire, 455 U.S. 331, 339-40 (1982) ("It is
indeed well settled that Congress may use its powers under the Commerce Clause to confer upon
the States an ability to restrict the flow of interstate commerce that they would not otherwise
enjoy." (internal quotation omitted)).
89. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 3 ("No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any
duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or
Compact with another State .. "). But see Michael S. Greve, Compacts, Cartels, and
CongressionalIntent, 68 MO. L. REV. 285 (2003) (describing cases in which federal courts appear
not to enforce the Compact Clause).
90. See Ernest A. Young, The Rehnquist Court's Two Federalisms, 83 TEX. L. REV. 1, 131
(2004) ("Preemption doctrine... starts from the proposition that the states and the Nation share
power in an area; its central preoccupation is the management of conflicts that inevitably arise
in such situations.").
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must speak with varying degrees of specificity to preempt state
action. 91 The shared authority view embodied in statutory preemption
governs much of public law, including civil rights, environmental
regulation, antitrust, and securities regulation.
There are alternative ways to approach the unpacking of
federal exclusivity. For example, it is possible to conceive of this as a
question of what default rules should allocate authority between the
federal and state governments. The first question is which level of
government has initial regulatory authority over an area. In this
regard, there are typically four options: both the federal and state
governments could possess initial authority to regulate, neither could
possess the authority to regulate, only the federal government could
possess the authority to regulate, or only the state governments could
possess the authority to regulate. Conventional wisdom is that only
the federal government possesses the authority to regulate
immigration. My argument, developed below, is that both the federal
and state governments possess initial authority over this subject.
The second question is whether and how one level of
government can affect the regulatory authority of another,
particularly how the actions of the federal government affect the
regulatory authority of the states. Assuming concurrent initial
authority, the federal government can preempt state authority,
pursuant to the Supremacy Clause. Even if the states possess no
initial authority to regulate (a view I reject below), the federal
government might authorize such regulation pursuant to a delegation
of authority.
B. The Category Error
With this taxonomy in mind, it is possible to assess the basis
for federal exclusivity in immigration law. Conventional wisdom holds
that immigration authority falls into the first category of preemption:
structural preemption. 92 Some Supreme Court cases appear to support
this understanding, 93 and the vast majority of immigration
scholarship is built on a structural preemption understanding of
federal exclusivity. 94 But the conventional wisdom is wrong. As I
demonstrate, there is no clear commitment in the text or institutional

91. See infra Part IV.D.
92. See, e.g., Wishnie, supra note 7, at 530-52 (explaining Supreme Court jurisprudence on
the exclusivity of the federal immigration power).
93. See infra Part II.B.1.c.
94. See supra note 18.
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structures of the Constitution to federal exclusivity, and historical
practice supports a statutory preemption view. Moreover, the
Supreme Court cases that appear to espouse a structural preemption
view of federal authority do not definitively adopt this view. In short,
federal exclusivity is better understood to rest on statutory
preemption.
1. Structural Preemption
a. Text
Unlike most other areas of law understood to be exclusively
federal, the text of the Constitution does not grant sole authority over
immigration to the federal government. 95 Instead, the Constitution
refers only to a uniform rule of naturalization. 96 The authority of the
federal government to regulate immigration has been found in other
sources, including the authority inherent in sovereignty, 97 the
authority to conduct foreign affairs, 98 and the authority to regulate
foreign commerce, 99 but not in the words of the Constitution.
The Constitution does explicitly forbid the states from engaging
in certain kinds of activities, including specific matters relating to
foreign affairs, such as entering into treaties or alliances. 10 0 This list
of prohibited activities, however, does not include regulating
immigration.
Although it could be argued that this textual silence is evidence
of the Framers' intent to share immigration authority among levels of
government, the silence is understood better as a politically expedient
hedge. The institution of slavery was an incendiary and divisive
95. See Sarah H. Cleveland, Powers Inherent in Sovereignty: Indians, Aliens, Territories,
and the Nineteenth Century Origins of Plenary Power over Foreign Affairs, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1, 8183 (2002) (describing, with a few minor and contested exceptions, the constitutional silence
"regarding governmental control over aliens," and noting that "[t]he constitutional text does not
expressly address authority to regulate immigration").
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (authorizing Congress "[t]o establish a uniform Rule of
Naturalization... throughout the United States").
97. See Chinese Exclusion Case, 130 U.S. 581, 631 (1889) (finding the power to exclude
foreigners to be an incident of sovereignty belonging to the government).
98. See, e.g., id. (locating federal authority to regulate immigration in the foreign affairs
power).
99. See, e.g., Head Money Cases, 112 U.S. 580, 591-93 (1884) (finding immigration to be a
subset of "commerce with foreign nations" and therefore within Congress's exclusive power to
regulate); Henderson v. New York, 92 U.S. 259, 270-71 (1876) (invalidating state-imposed tax on
debarking immigrants as conflicting with federal power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations).
100. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10.
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subject during the Constitutional Convention, 10 ' and any discussion of
immigration would have implicated slavery. 10 2 Reluctant to address
the issue, the Framers simply remained silent on the topic. 0 3 Thus,
although it is true that the text of the Constitution does not grant
exclusive authority over immigration to the national government, this
textual silence is not dispositive.
b. Institutional Structure
The institutional structures created by the Constitution lend
the greatest support to the claim of structural preemption. There are
two particularly salient arguments in this regard. First, the
traditional argument is that although the Constitution created a
federal system, subnational governments cannot exercise immigration
authority because to do so necessarily implicates national interests. A
uniform rule of immigration is necessary to serve those interests
because, for example, immigration law raises matters of international
concern. Thus, the United States must speak with one voice on such
matters, as unilateral state laws could be antithetical to the interests
of the union.' 0 4 As sometimes described by the Supreme Court, the
danger inherent in the Balkanization of immigration law is that one
state, for its own parochial reasons, has the power to embroil the
United States in an international conflict that may affect the entire
nation. 10 5 In this way, immigration authority is analogous to the
101. See DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, A HISTORY OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION
214-46 (2d ed. 2005) (noting that "[p]ublic attacks on... slavery began as early as the 1750s,"
and describing the heated debates during the Convention between supporters and opponents of
slavery).
102. See Cleveland, supra note 95, at 98 (describing fear of southern states "that free blacks
from the North and West Indies would provoke dissension and revolt among the slaves in their
territories," and "[b]ecause free blacks were citizens in some northern states, slaveholding states
felt that they could maintain the right to exclude free blacks only by asserting the power to
exclude all persons deemed dangerous or injurious to their interests"); Gerald L. Neuman, The
Lost Century of American ImmigrationLaw (1776-1875), 93 COLUM. L. REV. 1833, 1866-67 (1993)
(describing an argument made by historians that a primary cause of the federal government's
failure to adopt qualitative restrictions on immigration before the Civil War was the slave states'
jealous insistence on maintaining power over the movement of free blacks as a state's right).
103. See ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 78 (2006).

BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION

POLICY

IN THE

104. See Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-66 (1941) (noting foreign affairs implications of
immigration regulation); Chy Lung v. Freeman, 92 U.S. 275, 280 (1875) (same); Spiro, DemiSovereignties, supra note 11, at 134-44 (describing this argument).
105. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 64 (discussing the importance of protecting rights of a country's
own nationals when those nationals are in another country); Chy Lung, 92 U.S. at 279 ("[I]f
citizens of our own government were treated by any foreign nation as subjects of the Emperor of
China have been actually treated under this law, no administration could withstand the call for
a demand on such government for redress."). The Court gave the example of international
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foreign affairs power, over which the federal government traditionally
is understood to enjoy exclusive authority as a matter of structural
106
preemption.
Second, it has been argued that immigration law concerns
what some scholars have called "self-definition."' 10 7 A self-definition
view of immigration law holds that immigration is related to our
understanding of who we are as a nation.10 8 Because of the connection
between immigration and naturalization,1 0 9 immigration laws allow
existing citizens to select new citizens, thus effectively weighing in on
who can be an American.11 0 A self-definition view of immigration law
does not allow a role for states and localities because self-definition is
understood as a national process."'
This line of argument elevates the national interest in selfdefinition over the state and local interest in "self-preservation."
Immigration law as self-preservation is the view that immigration can
threaten the well-being of a polity, and therefore the polity must have
the ability to deny admission to some people and remove others. This
rationale arguably underlies many immigration laws, such as the laws
precluding the admission of a non-citizen who will become a public
charge, 1 2 who poses a public health threat," 3 or who has committed
specified crimes.11 4 A self-preservation view of immigration law
recognizes a role for states and localities because immigration directly
implicates their interests." 5 The self-definition line of argument
treaties that safeguard the rights of aliens while in other countries and found that one state's
effort to protect its own interests might run afoul of this international obligation, thus
embroiling the entire country in an international dispute. Hines, 312 U.S. at 62-66.
106. See supra note 84 (describing the dominant view that federal exclusivity in foreign
affairs rests upon structural preemption). But see supra text accompanying note 85 (describing
dissenting views); infra text accompanying notes 122-124 (discussing dissenting views on this
subject and Supreme Court's decision in Garamendi).
107. Motomura, supra note 18, at 1591. For more on the relationship between immigration
law and national self-definition, see ZOLBERG, supra note 103.
108. See Motomura, supra note 18, at 1591 ("[1]mmigration decisions give citizens the chance
to choose new citizens and decide who 'we' are as Americans. Immigration decisions also give
citizens the chance to establish and apply basic principles of government and public life. So
viewed, immigration is a process of national self-definition.").
109. See id. at 1594 (noting the significance of the Naturalization Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment in federalizing immigration law).
110. Id. at 1591.
111. Id.
112. 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(4) (2000).
113. Id. § 1182(a)(1).
114. Id. § 1182(a)(2).
115. See Schuck, supra note 64, at 390 (noting the "very important" problem of the "large and
systematic mismatch.., between the revenues that immigrants generate for [the federal]
government and the expenditures that [state] governments make on behalf of immigrants"). But
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acknowledges these interests but maintains that the self-definition
aspect of immigration law should take primacy over the self116
preservation aspect.
Despite their seeming appeal, these arguments concerning
institutional structure do not hold up. To begin with the self-definition
rationale for structural preemption, the dichotomy between selfdefinition and self-preservation is not sufficiently clear that it can
bear the weight of a constitutional mandate for federal exclusivity.
Although there is a connection between immigration and
naturalization, many non-citizens living long term in the United
States do not become naturalized citizens. 117 States and localities
maintain an interest in determining which non-immigrants (or even
immigrants who do not intend to become citizens) may be welcome
and which may not.118 Further, the Constitution does not clearly
require only a national process of self-definition.1 19 A citizen may form
an identity not just from being an American but also from being an
Idahoan, New Yorker, or Texan. Whether the Constitution permits
see supra note 70, (discussing a University of Arizona study finding positive fiscal and economic
impact from "immigrants," defined as all foreign-born individuals, although comprising largely
unauthorized migrants).
116. See Motomura, Whose Immigration Law?, supra note 18, at 1592 (arguing that selfdefinition has emerged not only as a coequal to self-preservation, but also as being "uniquely
within federal competence").
117. To begin, only legal permanent residents are eligible for citizenship. 8 U.S.C. § 1427(a).
Of the approximately twenty million non-citizens living long term in the United States in 2005
(not counting non-citizens here on short-term visas, such as students and temporary workers),
nearly ten million were here unlawfully and therefore could not become citizens. See STEVEN A.
CAMAROTA, CTR. FOR IMMIGRATION STUDIES, IMMIGRANTS AT MID-DECADE: A SNAPSHOT OF
AMERICA'S FOREIGN-BORN POPULATION IN 2005, at 23 (Dec. 2005), available at
http://www.cis.org/articles/2005/backl4O5.pdf (estimating between 9.6 and 9.8 million illegal
immigrants in the United States in 2005); NANCY F. RYTINA, OFFICE OF IMMIGRATION
STATISTICS, ESTIMATES OF THE LEGAL PERMANENT RESIDENT POPULATION AND POPULATION
ELIGIBLE TO NATURALIZE IN 2004, at 3 (Feb. 2006), available at http://www.dhs.gov/xlibrary/
assets/statistics/publications/LPRest2004.pdf (presenting estimates of numbers of legal
permanent residents eligible and ineligible to naturalize). Additionally, many of the legal
permanent residents who are eligible to naturalize chose not to do so, although the percentage
choosing to naturalize has been increasing. See JEFFREY S. PASSEL, PEW HISPANIC CTR.,
GROWING SHARE OF IMMIGRANTS CHOOSING NATURALIZATION 1 (2007), available at
http://pewhispanic.org/files/reports/74.pdf (reporting increase in naturalization rate to 52% as of
2005).
118. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 125-26 (explaining that tensions arise
between states when burdens associated with immigration fall unevenly among the states).
119. It could be argued that self-definition can occur at a regional level. In the context of
unauthorized migration, states are taking very different approaches to such migrants, with eight
states offering in-state tuition to unauthorized migrants on the one hand, see supra note 65, and
Arizona enacting a particularly punitive law to discourage unauthorized migration on the other,
see supra text accompanying notes 59-60. Thus, to use a short hand, it could well be that the
same individual is an "unauthorized migrant" in some states but an "illegal alien" in others,
reflecting various degrees of hostility and welcome to non-citizens.
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this regional self-definition is a determination best made using the
federalism lens, as I propose in Part III.
Turning to the claim that involvement by subnational actors
risks compromising national interests, an important starting point is
the observation that national exclusivity over immigration is not an
essential component of a federal system. Other countries with strong
central governments allow subnational governments to control
immigration. 120 It is possible for subnational units of government to
determine the content of admission laws without compromising the
interests of the national government. 121 In this way, the institutional
structure of the Constitution does not require federal exclusivity, as a
functional matter.
The invocation of foreign affairs also is unpersuasive. There is
a plausible argument that the Constitution does not prohibit all state
involvement in foreign relations, but instead prohibits states from
engaging in certain actions, such as making treaties and declaring
war. 22 In this view, the Constitution confers broad powers on the
national government to preempt state laws that interfere with
national prerogatives, but state authority does exist. Foreign affairs
and federalism are competing values, and the federal government
must decide when state conduct may adversely affect national
123
interests such that it should be preempted by federal action.
120. See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1840 n.34 (arguing that federal exclusivity "is neither
natural nor inevitable in United States federalism or in federalism generally, as illustrated by
Canada and Germany, where federal sub-units still have immigration responsibilities"); see also
Schuck, supra note 64, at 387-88 (describing immigration federalism developments in Canada,
Germany, and Switzerland); Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 122 (arguing that
federal exclusivity "is not a structural necessity").
121. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 122 ("[M]any, if not most, foreign
nations have come to understand fully the nature of American federalism. They understand that
where an individual state acts, the federal government bears no instigatory responsibility and,
indeed, that Washington is powerless to work its reversal as either a legal or a political matter.").
122. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10; RAMSEY, supra note 85 (arguing that the Framers
envisioned a role for the states in foreign affairs, as evidenced by Article I, Section 10's
prohibitions on state involvement in specified matters, by the Tenth Amendment, and by the
Supremacy Clause, which, taken together, allow for at least some state activity affecting foreign
affairs); Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, The Abiding Relevance of Federalism to U.S.
Foreign Relations, 92 AM. J. INT'L L. 675, 676-79 (1998) (finding a constitutional balance between
state and federal implementation of international obligations); Jack L. Goldsmith, The New
Formalism in United States Foreign Relations Law, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 1395, 1423 (1999)
(challenging the legitimacy of a "structural' preemption" argument in the area of foreign
relations).
123. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 122, at 677 ("This institutional arrangement
treats foreign relations and federalism as competing values and largely leaves it to the federal
political branches to decide when a state act has sufficiently adverse effects on foreign relations
to require preemption."); see also Neuman, supra note 102, at 1897 (noting that the federal
government alone can make treaties and negotiate with other countries, so it makes sense for the
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A Supreme Court opinion, discussed below, lends some support
to this view. In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the
Court found the particular state law at issue to be "preempt[ed] by
executive conduct in foreign affairs" but acknowledged that states,
when regulating matters of traditional state concern, could enact
legislation that touched on foreign affairs.' 24 Comparing immigration
authority to the foreign affairs powers, then, does not mean that
states and localities can play no role in immigration law. It means
that there are competing interests to balance.
Further, foreign affairs and immigration are related but not
completely analogous. In the context of foreign affairs, state and local
interests may be more attenuated. 125 By contrast, state and local
governments are affected substantially by immigration and possess an
undeniable economic and social stake in immigration. For example,
although exact numbers are contested, there is evidence to suggest
that state and local governments bear a disproportionate cost in
absorbing the consequences of immigration.' 26 Moreover, state and
local governments play a central role in the integration and
assimilation of non-citizens. As Cristina Rodriguez has argued, one of
the central functions of state and local governments is to assimilate
federal government to regulate immigration, but that this does not necessarily mean that state
regulation is unconstitutional).
124. 539 U.S. 396, 419-20, 428 (2003). For purposes of this Article, it is unnecessary to wade
into the substantial criticism of the case but for one example, see RAMSEY, supra note 85, at 28899.
125. For example, the law at issue in Crosby v. National Foreign Trade Council arguably was
an expression of Massachusetts' views of the military regime in Myanmar. See 530 U.S. 363, 37880 (2000). The law was not intended to protect the health or safety concerns of the state, but
rather was an attempt to sanction the regime for its acts in Myanmar. The residents of
Massachusetts may well feel strongly about the political state of affairs in Myanmar, but, as that
case suggests, the residents' views are best expressed as national views, at least to the extent the
national government has already expressed a view.
126. See The Budgetary Impact of Current and Proposed Border Security and Immigration
Polices: Hearing on H.R. 4437 and S. 2611 Before the S. Comm. on the Budget, 109th Cong. 4
(2006) (statement of Paul R. Cullinan, Chief, Human Resources Cost Estimates Unit of the
Congressional Budget Office), available at http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/75xx/doc7511/08-30Immigration.pdf ("CBO's review of the research on immigration found that over the long term,
immigration tends to affect federal finances positively and state and local finances negatively.").
This is a hotly contested issue and a central subject in current debates over immigration. For a
variety of views and a review of the research, see Comprehensive Immigration Reform Hearing,
supra note 73. One of the most widely cited, but now somewhat dated, sources on this issue is
NAT'L RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE NEW AMERICANS: ECONOMIC, DEMOGRAPHIC, AND FISCAL
EFFECTS OF IMMIGRATION (James P. Smith & Barry Edmonston eds., Nat'l Acad. Press, 1997).
See also Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 125-26 (noting that the "fiscal downside" of
illegal immigration is not spread evenly across state lines, and discussing "three discrete types of
costs to state governments"). But see supra note 70, (discussing University of Arizona study
finding positive fiscal and economic impact from "immigrants," defined as all foreign-born
individuals, although most were unauthorized migrants).
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non-citizens, thus allowing the country as a whole to adapt to the
127
demographic changes that immigration brings.
The reliance on the foreign affairs rationale for structural
preemption of immigration authority is losing persuasiveness over
time. When nation states were the only actors on the international
stage, a state inserting itself into pure immigration law could have
interfered with national interests. 128 But with the rise of actors other
than nation states, 129 there is less reason to prevent, as a
constitutional matter, subnational governments from engaging in
conduct that implicates foreign affairs. 30 Put differently, as other
countries grow accustomed to multiple actors, there is less cause for
concern about a state asserting its own interests in an international
setting. Other countries can assess that assertion in context and
13 1
understand that one state does not speak for the United States.
Additionally, state and local governments have played an important
role in bringing international rights into the domestic context and
132
thus helping to shape American norms.

127. See Rodriguez, supra note 11, at 581-609 (arguing that the structures of the nation state
struggle to capture the "diverse forms of membership needed to assimilate the effects of global
trends" and that the participation of unauthorized immigrants is "facilitated through the market
and through local communities, not through the national government"); see also Rick Su, The
Immigrant City (bepress Legal Series, Paper No. 1688, 2006), http://law.bepress.com/cgil
viewcontent.cgi?article=7930&context=expresso
(describing the potentially constructive role
cities can play in the development of immigration policy).
128. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties,supra note 11, at 153.
129. See Gerald E. Frug & David J. Barron, International Local Government Law, 38 URB.
LAW. 1 (2006) (describing emergence of twin phenomenon: interest of international actors in the
relationship between national governments and cities, and cities' "use of international
institutions to redefine the scope of their domestic legal powers," resulting in "international local
government law").
130. See id.; Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 153-54, 161-74. Professor
Motomura recognizes this argument as well, although he responds that the self-definition
understanding of immigration law still weighs in favor of federal exclusivity. Motomura, supra
note 6, at 1372-75.
131. See Spiro, Demi-Sovereignties, supra note 11, at 163-67 (discussing two examples where
the international community was savvy about dealing with the federalist structure of the United
States, targeting individual states rather than the nation as a whole: (1) a California unitary tax
scheme that disadvantaged UK-based Barclays Bank, which triggered British retaliatory action
only against corporations registered in California and other states with the unitary taxing
scheme, and (2) Mexico's response to the Proposition 187 ballot measure, which included
lobbying and boycotts aimed at California and an official statement from the Mexican
government which contained an "express recognition that the California law did not represent
the policies of the federal government").
132. See Judith Resnik, Law's Migration: American Exceptionalism, Silent Dialogues, and
Federalism'sMultiple Ports of Entry, 115 YALE L.J. 1564, 1626-52 (2006) (exploring the "intake
of transnational rights" through state courts, city councils, state legislatures, mayors, and
national organizations of local officials).
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A final, related point: the INA already incorporates
133
inconsistent state laws governing criminal conduct and marriage.
To be sure, the state laws matter only to the extent that the federal
government recognizes them, but this indicates the ability of
immigration law to withstand varying state-dependent rules.
Thus, the structural question is not simply how to preserve the
national government's interests. Rather, the question is how to
balance the Constitution's commitment to a federalist system against
an intuited interest in a uniform rule of immigration. Framed this
way, the commitment to federalism cannot be ignored. The implicit
uniformity interest, if it exists, must first be found in the structure
and relationships of the Constitution and then balanced against the
explicit interests of federalism.
c. HistoricalPractice
Turning to historical practice, the federal government has
dominated pure immigration law for the last century. Before the
federal government asserted control over immigration with a series of
exclusionary statutes beginning in 1875,134 however, states actively
controlled immigration in numerous ways. 135 These laws were not in
the form we are familiar with at the national level today, but they
133. Howard F. Chang, Public Benefits and Federal Authorization for Alienage
Discriminationby the States, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 357, 360 (2003).
134. Most notably the Act of Mar. 3, 1875, ch. 141, 18 Stat. 477, and the Chinese Exclusion
Act, ch. 126, 22 Stat. 58 (1882).
135. See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1841-83 (1993) (describing in general terms the kinds of
state laws during the period, including "regulation of the movement of criminals; public health
regulation; regulation of the movement of the poor; [and] regulation of slavery," and also noting
that some state laws applied to international as well as interstate migration). As Professor
Neuman explains, many of the early state statutes are not readily categorized as "immigration"
statutes because when states regulated the movement of people, they often did not distinguish
between citizens and non-citizens, instead drawing lines based on state citizenship. Id. at 1837.
Certainly, some state statutes did apply to the movement of people across international borders.
See, e.g., id. at 1842 & n.47 (discussing state statutes that prohibited the entry of convicts from
outside the United States). As Professor Neuman summarizes the history,
[i]mmigration law prior to 1875 was a complex hybrid of state and federal policy.
Federal decision-makers validated certain local policies. Congress gave explicit
approval to state quarantine laws and state laws excluding black aliens; Supreme
Court Justices assigned some categories of immigration regulation to state police
power in language that indicated approval rather than indifference; and the Executive
urged foreign governments to respect policies whose only statutory embodiment was
in state law. The failure to enact uniform immigration policies at the national level
resulted from a combination of forces-not just pro-immigration sentiment, but also a
desire to keep migration policy within state authority. When slavery ceased to divide
the nation, national immigration regulation became possible.
Id. at 1896-97. For another account of the state role in immigration, see ZOLBERG, supra note
103. at 1-23.
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were immigration laws nonetheless. 136 Importantly, although the
Supreme Court divided on the subject, opinions from the midnineteenth century, such as the Passenger Cases,137 can be read as
expressing approval of state immigration laws based on state police
38
powers, particularly over crime, indigence, and disease.'
This tradition of state involvement gave way to exclusive
federal authority in the last quarter of the nineteenth century, in part
because the abolition of slavery removed that contentious issue from
the field of immigration and thus made it less politically explosive for
the federal government to regulate immigration. 139 Additionally, the
influx of Chinese immigrants on the West Coast, and the subsequent
call for immigration restrictions to curb this influx, led to federal
action. The issue required negotiations with another country and
therefore could be resolved only at the national level. 40 In light of the
Court's disagreement about federal exclusivity, 4 1 it is highly unlikely
that the movement toward federal regulation was perceived as
constitutionally mandated.
This historical practice undermines the claims of structural
preemption in important ways. It makes clear that the institutional
structures created by the Constitution do not require federal
exclusivity. The basic institutions did not change from the nineteenth
century to the twentieth century. Instead, the need for uniform rules
changed. The federal response to this need-to enact such uniform
rules that, in effect, took over immigration from the states-does not
reflect a different understanding of constitutional mandates. Instead,
it simply reflects changing political forces.

136. See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1837, 1841; see also id. at 1837-38 ("For purposes of
this Article, a statute regulates immigration if it seeks to prevent or discourage the movement of
aliens across an international border, even if the statute also regulates the movement of citizens,
or movement across interstate borders, and even if the alien's movement is involuntary.").
137. 48 U.S. (7 How.) 283 (1949).
138. See Cleveland, supra note 95, at 99-106 (discussing cases and concluding that they
"brought little resolution of the power [of states] to restrict the entry and exit of aliens");
Neuman, supra note 102, at 1885-93 ("Even within this standard line of cases [read as
developing the exclusive federal power over immigration regulation], there is a counterstory to be
read that favors state authority.").
139. See Neuman, supra note 102, at 1896-97 ("When slavery ceased to divide the nation,
national immigration regulation became possible.").
140. See id. at 1897-98.
141. See Cleveland, supra note 95, at 106 (concluding that, during the antebellum period,
"[t[he Court was fiercely divided on the question" of federal exclusivity).
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At first glance, Supreme Court precedent appears to place
of
authority over pure immigration law squarely into the category 142
case.
seminal
the
is
Freeman
v.
Lung
Chy
structural preemption.
There, the Court found that a California statute, which required a
bond for certain classes of passengers arriving from a foreign port, had
the potential to incite an international incident. If this happened, the
Court speculated:
Upon whom would such a claim be made? Not upon the State of California; for, by our
Constitution, she can hold no exterior relations with other nations. It would be made
upon the government of the United States. If that government should get into a
difficulty which would lead to war, or to suspension of intercourse, would California
alone suffer, or all the Union? If we should conclude that a pecuniary indemnity was
proper as a satisfaction for the injury, would California pay it, or the Federal
government? If that government has forbidden the States to hold negotiations with any
foreign nations, or to declare war, and has taken the whole subject of these relations
upon herself, has the Constitution, which provides for this, done so foolish a thing as to
leave it in the power of the States to pass laws whose enforcement renders the general
government liable to just reclamations which it must answer, while it does not prohibit
to the States the acts for which it is held responsible?
The Constitution of the United States is no such instrument. The passage of laws which
concern the admission of citizens and subjects of foreign nations to our shores belongs to
Congress, and not to the States. It has the power to regulate commerce with foreign
nations: the responsibility for the character of those regulations, and for the manner of
their execution, belongs solely to the national government. If it be otherwise, 14a 3 single
State can, at her pleasure, embroil us in disastrous quarrels with other nations.

Taken alone, this language would appear to foreclose an
argument that pure immigration authority is shared among levels of
government. Indeed, this is the language that courts and scholars
typically invoke as the source of structural preemption.144
But courts and scholars oddly ignore the very next paragraph
of the case, where the Court left open the door for state regulation:
We are not called upon by this statute to decide for or against the right of a State, in the
absence of legislation by Congress, to protect herself by necessary and proper laws
against paupers and convicted criminals from abroad; nor to lay down the definite limit
of such right, if it exist. Such a right can only arise from a vital necessity for its exercise,
and cannot be carried beyond the scope of that necessity. When a State statute, limited
to provisions necessary and appropriate to that object alone, shall, in a proper
controversy, come before us, it will be time enough to decide that question. The statute

142. 92 U.S. 275 (1875).
143. Id. at 279-80.
144. See, e.g., Japan Line, Ltd. v. Los Angeles County, 441 U.S. 434, 450 n.16 (1979); Hines
v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 63 (1941); Cleveland, supranote 95, at 109 (discussing Chy Lung and
concluding that "the decision appeared motivated by a desire both to protect aliens seeking entry
from unequal and arbitrary state treatment and to preserve national control over foreign
relations"); Wishnie, supra note 7, at 530-32.
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of California goes so far beyond what is necessary, or even appropriate, for this purpose,
as to be wholly without any sound definition of the right under which it is supposed to
be justified. Its manifest purpose, as we have already said, is, not to obtain indemnity,
but money. 145

In this passage, the Court reserved the possibility that, in another
case, federal interests would need to be weighed against state
interests. 146 Indeed, had California's interests not been so patently
mercenary, the Court might have addressed the question in Chy Lung.
Other cases during the same period recognized state power
over immigration, narrowly defined, and expressed approval for state
immigration laws based on state police power. For example, the Court
noted that a state could regulate foreign commerce (a catchall
understood to cover immigration law) to the extent the state was
exercising its police power.147
Later Supreme Court cases miss the point of Chy Lung. The
typical modern case cites Chy Lung for the proposition that states and
localities play no role in pure immigration law, but that states and
localities may enact regulations falling outside of immigration law.
For example, in DeCanas v. Bica, the Court stated that the "power to
regulate [pure] immigration [law] is unquestionably exclusively a
federal power."'148 But this statement was dictum. The statute in
question did not regulate pure immigration law, as the Court then
recognized in finding that "standing alone, the fact that aliens are the
subject of a state statute does not render it a regulation of
49
immigration." 1
The repeated statements of federal exclusivity over pure
immigration law have made this proposition seem like a constitutional
145. 92 U.S. at 280 (emphasis added).
146. This type of balancing is precisely what I call for in infra Part III.
147. See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 203-06 (1824) (finding that conduct that
could be regulated by Congress because it concerned foreign commerce could also be regulated by
the states as an exercise of state police power, providing the state law did not conflict with the
federal law). For a longer discussion of this and other cases, see Neuman, supra note 102, at
1885-93. This nineteenth century trend has modern echoes in dictum from the Supreme Court
noting that states may regulate pursuant to their traditional authority even if that regulation
touches upon foreign affairs. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 418-20 (2003)
(reviewing several Court opinions addressing potential conflicts between state laws and federal
authority over foreign affairs, and concluding that "it would be reasonable to consider the
strength of the state interest.., when deciding how serious a conflict must be shown before
declaring the state law preempted").
148. 424 U.S. 351, 354 (1976).
149. Id. at 364-65 (upholding state statute that prohibited an employer from knowingly
employing non-citizens without lawful residence status if such employment would have an
adverse effect on lawful resident workers); see also id. at 355 ("[T]he Court has never held that
every state enactment which in any way deals with aliens is a regulation of immigration and
thus per se pre-empted by this constitutional power, whether latent or exercised.").
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inevitability, 150 but the cases do not address pure immigration laws.
There has thus never been an occasion for the Court to explore the
second excerpt from Chy Lung, which left open the possibility that
states may have a role to play in pure immigration law. Indeed, states
and localities have not enacted pure immigration laws since the end of
the nineteenth century, and now the comprehensive INA statutorily
preempts such enactments. Absent a radical change in immigration
law, we are unlikely to see any cases raising this issue.
In short, the first excerpt from Chy Lung has become a third
rail and has contributed to the belief that authority over pure
immigration law is structurally committed to the federal government
alone. But Supreme Court precedent does not ineluctably lead to this
conclusion. 1' 5 Despite the traditional narrative of federal exclusivity
52
over immigration, there is room for an alternative narrative.
Instead of establishing a constitutional mandate for exclusive federal
authority over immigration law, Supreme Court precedent embodies
the tension between the national interest in a uniform rule and the
states' interests in exercising their police power to protect their
citizens.

150. In another example, the Court stated in Hines v. Davidowitz that it would rule on only
one question, "expressly leaving open all of appellees' other contentions, including the argument
that the federal power in this field, whether exercised or unexercised, is exclusive." 312 U.S. 52,
62 (1941). The Court then applied a statutory preemption analysis, finding that "the regulation
of aliens is so intimately blended and intertwined with the responsibilities of the national
government that where it acts, and the state also acts on the same subject, the act of
Congress... is supreme; and the law of the state, though enacted in the exercise of powers not
controverted, must yield to it." Id. at 66. Finding that the federal government's authority was
"superior," and that Congress had enacted "a complete scheme of regulation," the Court found
the state provision preempted. Id.
151. Although Professor Cleveland argues that "the Court's decisions between 1875 and 1886
rejected the possibility of an exclusive or concurrent state power over immigration and upheld an
exclusive federal authority to impose head taxes and inspect immigrants," Cleveland, supra note
95, at 121, she also notes that at least one of the leading cases likely rested on statutory
preemption, see id. at 109-10 (discussing New York v. Compagnie Ggngrale Transatlantique,107
U.S. 59 (1883), where the Court struck down a New York quarantine statute arguably because
the federal government had enacted immigration legislation and the Court concluded that the
state and federal statutes "cannot coexist"). The other central case from that time, Henderson v.
Mayor of New York, 92 U.S. 259 (1875), did conclude that immigration authority was exclusively
federal. See id. at 272-74 (finding that "this whole subject has been confided to Congress by the
Constitution"). Although this would appear to foreclose the possibility of concurrent state
authority, the Court handed down this decision and the decision in Chy Lung-with the
language quoted in the text, which explicitly left the door open for at least some state
regulation-on the same day. My argument is not that the decisions from this era clearly
recognized concurrent state authority, but rather that the decisions did not completely foreclose
the possibility of state authority to regulate immigration based on a state's police powers.
152. Neuman, supra note 102, at 1887.
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2. Dormant Preemption
As a practical matter, federal exclusivity exists with respect to
immigration law (as narrowly defined), but this practice is not
constitutionally mandated. The text and structure of the Constitution
do not require federal exclusivity and instead admit of a role for states
and localities. This conclusion is supported by historical practice and
is not foreclosed by Supreme Court precedent. Concluding that
authority over pure immigration law does not fall into the structural
preemption category leaves unanswered the question whether federal
exclusivity rests on dormant preemption or statutory preemption.
Dormant preemption is exceedingly rare in constitutional
law. 153 Unless explicitly embodied in the text of the Constitution, as
with the Compact Clause, some scholars consider it a controversial
notion because the dormancy creates the potential for judicial
activism. 154 There is no reason to subject immigration authority to this
dubious constitutional status. No textual mandate for dormant
preemption exists. The institutional structures created by the
Constitution do not indicate a need for a dormant power. There is no
judicial recognition of such a power. And a dormant preemption view
of immigration authority cannot account for the state immigration
laws in force before the twentieth century.
3. Statutory Preemption
In contrast to both structural preemption and dormant
preemption, a statutory preemption understanding of immigration
authority gives greater constitutional coherence to the current reality
of federal dominance in immigration law, as well as to the historical
practice of state regulation.1 55 It explains why states and localities

153. For a discussion of dormant preemption in general, and in the foreign affairs context in
particular, see RAMSEY, supra note 85, at 273-82 (arguing against finding a broad dormant
preemption of foreign affairs authority).
154. See, e.g., Robert Nagel, The Formulaic Constitution, 84 MICH. L. REV. 165, 201 (1985)

(observing that, when applying the dormant Commerce Clause in Kassel v. Consolidated
Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662, 670-76 (1981), "the Court retains the option either to defer to or
to second-guess the legislative judgment," then "insist[s] on appearing to exercise both these
choices").
155. A statutory preemption view of immigration authority still allows for national
uniformity. For better or worse, statutory preemption precludes a role for the states on what may
be important issues. See Young, supra note 90, at 130-31 ("The whole point of preemption is
generally to force national uniformity on a particular issue, stifling state-by-state diversity and
experimentation. And preemption removes issues within its scope from the policy agenda of state
and local governments, requiring that citizen participation and deliberation with respect to those
issues take place at the national level.").
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have not asserted a role in immigration law, as narrowly defined,
since the nineteenth century. Since then, the federal government has
taken an increasingly active role in pure immigration law, preempting
state and local immigration laws. The comprehensive INA, which is
still in force today, statutorily preempts all state and local laws
governing the admission and removal of non-citizens. This shift
explains the difference between state and local involvement at the end
of the nineteenth century and today: Our understanding of the
constitutional commitment of authority over pure immigration law
has not changed. Such authority always has rested simultaneously
with the national and subnational governments. In the late
nineteenth century, the national government had not yet preempted
state and local laws. Today it has.
In sum, the Constitution allows the national and subnational
governments to share immigration authority. To the extent that the
federal government does not exercise its authority-that is, it does not
statutorily preempt state and local laws-subnational governments
are free to exercise their authority to regulate immigration. This
authority rests on the subnational governments' police power to
regulate health and safety. 156 Absent federal statutory preemption,
state and local governments enjoy some residual authority. In other
words, the Constitution does not foreclose a substantive role for state
and local governments, but, as in all other areas of shared authority it
does allow the federal government to take the lead-and sometimes to
take over entirely. Immigration authority, then, is not so different
from other areas of law and is best understood to be shared between
the national and subnational governments. It stands apart only in the
degree of federal statutory preemption.
C. Implications of Shared Authority
If states and localities have not enacted pure immigration laws
in more than a hundred years, 157 it is fair to ask why it was necessary
to determine the underpinnings of federal exclusivity. As I
156. It is uncertain whether the constitutional right to travel articulated in Shapiro v.
Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969), would prohibit state laws regulating the movement of noncitizens. As reinterpreted in Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 501, 503 (1999), the right to travel is
grounded in the privileges and immunity clause, which protects only citizens. Chang, supra note
133, at 362 n.30.
157. One important exception is the incorporation of state criminal and marriage laws, on
which immigration laws often turn. Id. at 360. To be sure, the state laws matter only to the
extent that the federal government recognizes them, but, with regard to the delegation question
discussed below, this incorporation of state laws typically is not seen as an unconstitutional
delegation, perhaps telling us something important about the recognition of state authority.
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demonstrate more fully in Part IV, the nature of the preemption
makes all the difference in evaluating the constitutionality of the
conduct that states and localities are undertaking. Placing authority
over pure immigration law in the statutory preemption category
informs questions of the delegation of federal authority and the
existence of inherent state authority to enforce immigration laws. It
also informs how courts assess the substantive laws that states and
localities are enacting.
If we think authority over pure immigration law is structurally
committed to the federal government alone, then we are deeply
skeptical of any state and local conduct related to immigration and
aliens because the categories of immigration law and alienage law
bleed together and because we believe that the federal interests are
paramount. By contrast, if we think the national and subnational
governments have shared authority as a default constitutional matter,
then we simply can ask the classic federalism questions set forth in
Part III to determine the proper allocation of authority.
With an understanding that authority over pure immigration
law is shared among levels of government, state and local involvement
is far less suspect, and it becomes possible to engage in a more
productive and refined debate over the proper allocation of authority.
A statutory preemption understanding of pure immigration law thus
leads to a more dynamic relationship between the national and
subnational governments. As I argue in Part III, traditional
federalism values provide useful tools for structuring the debate about
the possible roles for each level of government.
Before turning to that argument, it is helpful to alter slightly
the terms used to describe the laws and conduct at issue. Once it is
understood that the claim of constitutionally mandated federal
exclusivity over pure immigration law is highly contestable, it makes
more sense to think about immigration law and alienage law as part
of a continuum of immigration regulation. This conception better
reflects the interplay between immigration laws and alienage laws
and guards against the constitutionally unwarranted skepticism of a
more robust role for state and local governments. It also means that
we need not police the line between immigration law and alienage law
too closely-all levels of government have authority over both types of
regulation. This understanding opens the door to a debate, through a
federalism lens, about the proper role state and local governments
should play.
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III. THE VALUE OF THE VALUES OF FEDERALISM
Determining that federal exclusivity rests on statutory
preemption does not end the debate over the proper allocation of
immigration authority among levels of government, nor does it mean
that state and local governments may play an unfettered role in
immigration regulation. Instead, concluding that immigration
authority may be shared among levels of government opens the door to
weighing the interests and values traditionally implicated in debates
over the respective roles of the national and subnational governments.
This Part demonstrates that the federalism lens is a particularly apt
tool for courts, policymakers, and scholars to use when examining the
difficult questions posed by state and local involvement in
immigration regulation.
A. Competing Values in Federalism
In light of the institutional structures created by the
Constitution, in most areas of law there is a vigorous and
longstanding debate about the proper allocation of authority among
levels of government. This debate has yielded certain core values that
scholars and courts use to try to answer questions of institutional
structure and allocation of authority.
On one side, court decisions and scholars favoring devolution
and decentralization cite four central benefits: First, decentralization
is thought to encourage experimentation-creating the proverbial
"laboratories of democracy."'158 Such pluralism in turn encourages and
lowers the cost of innovation. 159 Second, it is believed that efficiency
and effectiveness are enhanced when state governments must compete
for residents and resources. 160 Decentralization allows subnational
158. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). See
generally Michael C. Dorf & Charles F. Sabel, A Constitutionof Democratic Experimentalism, 98
COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998) (presenting a model of U.S. federalism as enabling national
coordination of local solutions to various types of problems). Some commentators distinguish
decentralization from federalism, e.g., Edward Rubin & Malcom Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes
on a National Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903, 910-14 (1994), recognizing the potential benefits
of the former in some instances while remaining critical of the latter, see id. at 914-26.
159. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991) ("This federalist structure of joint
sovereigns ...allows for more innovation and experimentation in government.").
160. See id. (arguing that state authority "makes government more responsive by putting the
States in competition for a mobile citizenry"); Richard Briffault, "What about the 'Ism?"
Normative and Formal Concerns in Contemporary Federalism, 47 VAND. L. REV. 1303, 1314
(1994) (describing the theoretical benefits of state competition within a federal system). The
argument, as advanced by Charles Tiebout, is that sub-national governments can be conceived of
as acting like private firms competing for profits, although the competition is for citizens. See
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governments to respond to local preferences, and the possibility of exit
and
accountability
efficiency. 161 Third, political
encourages
participation are thought to be furthered because subnational
governments are able to satisfy the interests of smaller groups and
allow more individuals to participate in decisionmaking. 162 Finally,
devolution and decentralization are considered checks against
1 63
national power, protecting both states' rights and individual rights.
Critics of devolution and decentralization cite a competing set
of values. According to these commentators, a strong national
government serves an interest in uniformity, 6 4 which furthers
fairness and equality. 165 Additionally, a strong national government
better serves economic interests because it is less likely to be captured
Charles Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. POL. ECON. 416, 418 (1956) ("[T]he
consumer-voter moves to that community whose local government best satisfies his set of
preferences.").
161. See ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY: RESPONSES TO DECLINE IN
FIRMS, ORGANIZATIONS, AND STATES 21-29 (1970) (describing how exit helps organizations
promote efficiency); Clayton Gillette, Regionalization and Interlocal Bargains,76 N.Y.U. L. REV.
190, 200-02 (2001) (arguing that the expansion of jurisdictional boundaries threatens the
benefits of decentralization because, among other reasons, minority dissenters within larger
jurisdictions have higher exit costs and therefore less credible threats of migration when local
government does not account for their preferences).
162. See Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458 (noting that dual sovereignty "increases opportunity for
citizen involvement in democratic processes"); DAVID L. SHAPIRO, FEDERALISM: A DIALOGUE 91106, 139 (1995) ("[Olne of the stronger arguments for a decentralized political structure is that,
to the extent the electorate is small, and elected representatives are thus more immediately
accountable to individuals and their concerns, government is brought closer to the people, and
democratic ideals are more fully realized."); Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The Political Economy of
Cooperative Federalism: Why State Sovereignty Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96
MICH. L. REV. 813, 856 n.152 (1998) ("[B]y devolving power to territorially circumscribed states
responsive to a local electorate, federal regimes allow groups smaller than a national majority to
satisfy their preferences for public goods, multiply opportunities for political participation, and
diffuse power in a way to promote electoral competition.").
163. See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 181 (1992) ("[Fjederalism secures to
citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."' (quoting Coleman v.
Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 759 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting))); Gregory, 501 U.S. at 458
("Perhaps the principal benefit of the federalist system is a check on abuses of government
power."); Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1448-51 (1987)
("[F]ederalism enabled the American People to conquer government power by dividing it. Each
government agency, state and national, would have incentives to win the principal's affections by
monitoring and challenging the other's misdeeds.").
164. Dissenting opinions in Supreme Court decisions express these concerns, as well. See,
e.g., Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. College Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 652
(1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("It was equally appropriate for Congress to abrogate state
sovereign immunity in patent infringement cases in order to close a potential loophole in the
uniform federal scheme, which, if undermined, would necessarily decrease the efficacy of the
process afforded to patent holders.").
165. See SHAPIRO, supra note 162, at 138 ("[The moral and practical forces favoring equality
look toward the virtues of uniformity not only as a cost-saver but as something approaching a
natural right.").
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by economic interest groups,1 66 can more easily correct for market
imperfections and failures, 67 can guard against a regulatory race to
the bottom, 168 and is more efficient. 169 Finally, a strong national
government better protects the fundamental rights of individuals and
groups, as evidenced by the history of race relations and the numerous
Supreme Court decisions striking down state laws that infringed on
freedom of speech, free exercise, and the rights of criminal
170
defendants.
Arguments concerning these core values are well rehearsed
and need not be repeated at length here. 7 1 Instead, the relevant

166. See id. at 44-45 (describing Madison's argument that a strong centralized government
offers economic benefits because, among other reasons, "the range of parties and interests that
would exist within the territorial jurisdiction of such a large national government would be so
wide that no single faction, or small group of factions, could exercise power for selfish purposes").
167. See id. at 42, 46 ("[Wlhen market imperfections call for some regulatory action, social
welfare is more likely to be maximized when such action is taken on a national level.").
168. See id. at 42-43 (describing the necessity for uniform national regulation to overcome
states' economic incentives to compete by under-regulating).
169. See id. at 46-50 (presenting examples of problems more efficiently addressed on a
national level because of its greater combined resources and/or centralized authority).
170. See id. at 50-56 (summarizing the history of federal protection of individuals and groups
disfavored by state and local authorities); Harry N. Scheiber, Constitutional Structure and the
Protection of Rights: Federalism and the Separationof Powers, in POWER DIVIDED: ESSAYS ON
THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF FEDERALISM 17, 26 (H. Schieber & M. Feeley eds., 1989) (noting

benefits of federalism, but concluding that "the record of American federalism ... represents
tragic failure with regard to acting as a bulwark of liberty").
171. These competing, core values play out in four basic models of federalism: (1) dual
federalism, see Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 714-15 (1999); (2) cooperative federalism, see New
York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 167-68 (1992); Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional
Architecture for Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 665 (2001) ("In contrast to dual
federalism, cooperative federalism envisions a sharing of regulatory authority between the
federal government and the states that allows the states to regulate within a framework
delineated by federal law."); (3) empowerment federalism, see Erwin Chemerinsky, Theories of
Federalism: Federalism Not as Limits, But as Empowerment, 45 U. KAN. L. REV. 1219, 1239
(1997); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, The Values of Federalism, 47 FLA. L. REV. 499, 539 (1995)
("[Flederalism can be reconceived not as about limiting federal power or even as about limiting
state or local power. Rather, it should be seen as based on the desirability of empowering
multiple levels of government to deal with social problems."); and (4) interactive federalism, see
Robert A. Schapiro, Toward a Theory of Interactive Federalism, 91 IOWA L. REV. 243, 243, 245
(2005) (arguing that the "interaction of national and state governments, rather than their
separation, [is] the primary means of realizing the aims of federalism," and therefore arguing in
favor of "polyphonic federalism[, which] does not divide state and federal authority, but instead
seeks to harness the interaction of state and national power to advance the goals associated with
federalism"). The extent to which each model protects or threatens these values is contested
empirically and normatively, however.
One benefit of applying a federalism lens to immigration is that it allows us to draw upon the
rich descriptive frameworks of the various models of federalism. Current state and local
immigration regulation does not fall neatly into any one model of federalism but instead
embodies strains of many of the models. For example, the enforcement of immigration law could
be described as both cooperative federalism and dual federalism. The enforcement anticipated by
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question is how these values may help structure the debate concerning
the proper allocation of authority over immigration regulation among
levels of government.
B. Immigration through a Federalism Lens
The federalism debate, raging for more than two centuries,
provides a rich vocabulary and nuanced landscape against which to
examine questions of the division of power. To date, this debate has
not been applied in a systematic way in the immigration context. To
be sure, some commentators have singled out certain federalism
values, but the selection tends to be both outcome determinative and
dependent on the substantive commitments of the commentator. Thus,
commentators who believe that state and local enforcement of
immigration law enhances national security identify decentralization
values in immigration regulation-the importance of drawing on a
wider array of law enforcement resources than those in the federal
concerned about
government. 172 By contrast, commentators
discrimination against non-citizens identify national uniformity as a
goal that precludes a state role in immigration regulation. 173 In this
Section, I do not take sides on the substantive issues, but rather
demonstrate the relevance and robustness of traditional federalism
debates to the novel questions raised by immigration federalism.

section 287(g) neatly fits the paradigm of cooperative federalism, with the federal government
establishing the goals of enforcement and then permitting states and localities to take an active
role on the ground, subject to federal supervision. Other types of state and local enforcement are
better described as falling under the dual federalism model, with sub-national units drawing on
their inherent authority to enforce federal law and doing so without federal oversight. In another
example, immigration regulation increasingly embodies the interactive federalism model. State
governments have sued the federal government to enforce federal immigration law, and the
federal government is looking to states and localities for assistance in the enforcement of
immigration law. Finally, federal laws such as the Personal Responsibility and Work
Opportunity Reconciliation Act manifest elements of an empowerment federalism model. The
federal government empowers the states to do what they otherwise could not do-discriminate
on the basis of alienage.
One of the issues raised by shared authority will be to determine which model of federalism
best furthers the interests of the various levels of government. As noted above, there are various
elements of each model; it may not be strictly necessary to elevate one model over others, but
over time it may become apparent which model best embodies and serves the multiple, and often
divergent, interests at stake.
172. See Kobach, supra note 10, at 183-99 (describing the importance to national security of
state and local enforcement of immigration regulations).
173. See Wishnie supra note 7, at 552-58 (arguing that "devolution would erode the
antidiscrimination and anticaste principles that are at the heart of our Constitution and that
have long protected noncitizens at the subfederal level").
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Uniformity versus experimentalism. Of all the competing values
in the immigration context, uniformity and experimentalism are most
clearly in tension. There are strong practical arguments for a uniform
rule of pure immigration law. For example, although I argued above
that the concern about a state embroiling the United States in an
international conflict should not lead to a rule of structural
preemption, 174 the concern is important. There are good reasons for
preventing states from asserting themselves in the international
arena, but this concern can be accounted for by weighing the interest
in a uniform rule of pure immigration law more heavily than the
interest in experimental immigration laws. The federal government,
through statutory preemption, already has precluded a role for states
and localities in pure immigration law. 175 Therefore, the federalism
argument is simply a backstop.
Moving beyond pure immigration law and looking at
immigration regulation more generally, a decentralized system has
some advantages. In a world where some states are offering in-state
tuition to unauthorized migrants 176 while the federal government is
seeking to construct a wall along the southern border, 177 it is by no
means clear that the national government will better protect the
interests of non-citizens. At other points in history, however, the roles
have been reversed. Indeed, all levels of government can and have
expressed both hostility and openness to non-citizens. In short, there
is no structural reason to believe that one level of government will be
more or less welcoming to non-citizens and therefore, on this basis, to
favor uniformity over experimentalism.
Decentralizing and devolving decisionmaking regarding noncitizens may accommodate, and reflect a greater variety of views on,
non-citizens and perhaps even mitigate pressure on the federal
government to enact legislation that reflects ardently held views of a
small but vocal portion of the population. 178 Decentralization and
174. See supra Part II.B.1.b.
175. This is not completely true. Current federal immigration law incorporates state criminal
and marriage laws and thus can lead to divergent results, depending on the location of the noncitizen. See Chang, supra note 133, at 360 (observing that divergent state marriage laws cause
inconsistent immigration consequences). In other words, immigration regulation already is not
uniform. Of course, the decision to incorporate divergent state laws was made at the national
level, but it is some indication of the tolerance for nonuniformity.
176. See supra note 65.
177. See Secure Fence Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-367 (2006) (codified at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1103
note, 1701 note).
178. See Spiro, supra note 6, at 1628-46 ("Those states desiring stricter enforcement of
immigration laws could pursue that objective without imposing their preference on states in
which immigration might be considered a neutral or positive factor."). For an argument in favor
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devolution might ensure, for better or worse, that the national
government does not enact legislation reflecting extremes at either
end of the political spectrum.
A system that allows states and localities to express divergent
views on the benefits and costs of immigration would permit the
development of a variety of policies, rather than a single, national
policy, creating the proverbial laboratories from which the national
government (or states and localities) can learn. This devolution also
would allow for greater tailoring of immigration policy. For example,
giving senators from Alaska a voice in determining the demographic
make-up of the work force in the agricultural southwest dilutes the
ability of those states and localities to shape immigration regulation to
reflect their needs and interests.
State and local experiments in immigration regulation can lead
to quick lessons. There is mounting evidence that the divergent state
and local laws are affecting the movement of non-citizens. For
example, after Colorado passed a spate of laws in 2006 making life
more difficult for unauthorized migrants by requiring certain forms of
identification and curtailing many public benefits, 179 the state saw a
dramatic decrease in the number of migrant workers available to work
on farms, to the great dismay of potential employers.18 0 Riverside,
New Jersey, had a similar experience, leading the town to repeal its
181
anti-immigrant ordinance.
of experimentalism in immigration, see Matthew Parlow, A Localist's Case for Decentralizing
Immigration Policy, 84 DENV. U. L. REV. 1061, 1069-73 (2007) (observing that "local government
experimentation in the immigration realm can lead to successes or failures that can inform
federal policy-making").
179. See, e.g., COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-76.5-103(1) (2007) ("[Elach agency or political
subdivision of the state shall verify the lawful presence in the United States of each natural
person eighteen years of age or older who applies for state or local public benefits or for federal
public benefits for the applicant."); id. § 24-76.5-103(4) (allowing only specified forms of
identification to establish immigration status, including a Colorado driver's license or
identification card; a United States military card or a military dependent's identification card; a
Native American tribal document; or an affidavit stating the individual is "otherwise lawfully
present in the United States pursuant to federal law").
180. See Dan Frosch, Inmates Will Replace Wary Migrants in Colorado Fields, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 4, 2007, at Al (describing the severe shortage of agricultural workers in the wake of antiimmigrant laws and the efforts to replace those workers with inmates; also describing the
decisions by potential workers to stay in New Mexico or other states, to the great chagrin of local
farmers); see also Beth Potter, Are State's Immigration Laws Chasing away Workers?, DENV.
Bus. J., Apr. 13, 2007, at Al (describing the same shortage in agriculture and also finding
anecdotal evidence that the anti-immigrant laws are affecting other industries, such as
construction).
181. See Ken Belson & Jill P. Capuzzo, Towns Rethink Laws Against Illegal Immigrants,
N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 26, 2007, at Al (detailing how Riverside, New Jersey, repealed an ordinance
"penalizing anyone who employed or rented to an illegal immigrant," and thus "join[ed] a small
but growing list of municipalities nationwide that have begun rethinking such laws as their legal
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Further, permitting states and localities to have a role in
determining levels of immigration law enforcement would
acknowledge the important economic and social stake that
subnational governments have in immigration. To the extent that the
national policy does not address these concerns, the subnational
governments should be able to do so. If state and local governments
discourage the presence of non-citizens to their economic and social
detriment, this experimentalism should correct itself quickly.
On the other hand, emphasizing uniformity might lead to the
conclusion that the federal government-and not Farmers Branch,
Texas, or Escondido, California-should determine the appropriate
level of enforcement of the country's immigration laws. If, for a variety
of political, social, and economic reasons, the United States chooses
not to remove all unauthorized migrants and not to seal the border
completely, then this determination arguably should bind states and
localities.
Efficiency and effectiveness. The experimentalism that would
be fostered under devolution and decentralization might promote the
values of efficiency and effectiveness. If one state determined that
welcoming non-citizens was to its economic and social advantage, and
this prediction held true, then that state would be rewarded by its
immigrant-friendly policies. A state drawing a different conclusion
might be rewarded when its prediction came true. Conversely, if the
predictions were inaccurate, then the states would lose out
economically and socially.
Allowing states and localities to encourage or discourage the
presence of non-citizens also would allow these subnational
governments to tailor their laws to their labor needs. For example, one
state might want to encourage non-citizens to work in agriculture
while another state might prefer to bolster the workforce in the
technology industry. Indeed, the relationship between immigration
law and the demands for labor has deep roots,1 8 2 and permitting
experimentation simply would bring this connection to a local level,
allowing for a more finely tuned supply and demand of labor.
On the other hand, these localized results and the potential
efficiencies might run afoul of national interests. For example, if every
state passed laws discouraging non-citizens' presence, admittance into
and economic consequences have become
immigrants left the town).
182. See ZOLBERG, supra note 103, at
Alexander Hamilton, and James Madison to
and labor to determine what immigration
building and economic development").

clearer" after "hundreds, if not thousands," of
3-4 (describing the efforts of Thomas Jefferson,
explore "the relationship between population, land,
policy would best serve broader goals of nation-
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the country from the national government might have little practical
effect. A non-citizen could cross the border but would not be welcomed
by any state. In this way, states and localities could thwart national
immigration policy. Setting aside the constitutional aspect of
unencumbered interstate travel,1 8 3 the free movement of people may
be essential to a robust economy. Permitting state and local
governments to express varying degrees of welcome and hostility to
non-citizens could discourage non-citizens from moving where they
wish to go, perhaps in search of better economic opportunities.
For these reasons, a uniform rule may be more efficient and
may ward off state and local parochialism that could threaten national
interests. This latter argument often is advanced in favor of structural
preemption. My point is that we need not set immigration law apart
from mainstream constitutional law with a rule of structural
preemption. Instead, we can account for these concerns through a
federalism lens.
8 4 Although some commentators
Protectionof individual rights.1
contend that non-citizens are at greater risk when the states take a
more active role in the regulation of immigration,1 8 5 this hypothesis
has not always proven true as an empirical matter. 8 6 In light of the
explicitly race-based federal immigration laws in effect as late as
1952, there is no particular reason to think that the federal
government is better at protecting individual rights. 8 7 Some recent
state and local laws explicitly have sought to protect non-citizens'
individual rights: many major cities have "sanctuary laws" that
prohibit law enforcement officers from specified conduct, such as
183. See supra note 156.
184. For a discussion of fundamental rights apart from their consideration in federalism
debates, see infra Part III.C.
185. See Wishnie, supra note 7, at 515-18.
186. See Schuck, supra note 64, at 389-90 (noting that the anticipated "race to the bottom"
has not occurred and instead numerous states, including those with large immigrant
populations, have restored benefits on the state level that had been lost at the federal level, in
some instances providing new benefits, including under Medicaid). As Professor Chang notes,
instead of the laboratories of bigotry that Professor Wishnie hypothesizes, see Wishnie, supra
note 7, at 553, "we might just as plausibly view federal authorization of divergent state policies
as creating laboratories of generosity toward immigrants," Chang, supra note 133, at 363-64
(emphasis added). But see Vock, supra note 64 (noting that "laws restricting the rights or
benefits of illegal immigrants outnumber laws benefiting them by a 2-1 ratio").
187. See Romero, supra note 11, at 383 ("Mhe bottom line appears to be this sad fact: if
racism within immigration law and policy is systemic, then devolution will not cure the
problem."); see also Chang, supra note 133, at 363-66 (arguing that a nondevolvability principle
serves the interest of uniformity, but not necessarily antidiscrimination). Professor Chang
further argues that it is conceivable that insisting on nondevolvability may lead Congress, in
some instances, to enact laws more discriminatory than those that might be enacted pursuant to
the devolution of federal authority. See id. at 364.
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inquiring into a person's immigration status.18 8 Although one of the
goals of such policies is to encourage unauthorized migrants to report
non-citizens
crimes without fear of detection, the policies also protect
18 9
laws.
of
enforcement
the
in
from racial discrimination
Increasedpolitical participationand political accountability. A
traditional argument is that political participation increases with the
localization of government1 90 but that such decisionmaking likely will
be parochial, increasing the chance that negative externalities will be
in the
imposed on communities that cannot participate
decisionmaking process. 191 In the context of immigration, however,
this traditional trade-off is complicated by the fact that non-citizens
cannot vote at any level of government. 92 To be sure, other forms of
participation are available,1 93 but direct participation is elusive, and
therefore, the benefit of decentralization and devolution is not obvious.
By contrast, the potential for imposing externalities on other
communities remains strong. Through its regulation, a state or
locality could affect patterns of immigration beyond its borders.
Whether, in each case, the effect was a negative or positive externality
would be a matter of debate, but the potential to affect others exists.

188. See Kittrie, supra note 3, at 1466-75 (describing "sanctuary policies" in effect in
numerous large cities).
189. See id. at 1475-77 (observing that the "complexity of federal immigration law inevitably
results in poorly trained local officials engaging in profiling by using race and ethnicity as
proxies for immigration status").
190. See SHAPIRO, supra note 162, at 139 (arguing that the existence of state and local
political power "serve[s] the important function of bringing democracy closer to the people").
191. Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part I-Localism and Legal Theory, 90 COLUM. L.
REV. 346, 429 (1990).
192. Under current law, non-citizens are unable to vote, at least in federal elections and in
the vast majority of non-federal elections. This has not always been the case. Historically, at
least twenty-two states and territories allowed non-citizens to vote. Jamin B. Raskin, Legal
Aliens, Local Citizens: The Historical, Constitutionaland Theoretical Meanings of Alien Suffrage,
141 U. PA. L. REV. 1391, 1393 (1993).
193. See, e.g., Oscar Avila, Marchers Plan Their Next Step, CHI. TRIB., May 3, 2006, at 3
(describing similar marches in Chicago with 100,000 people rallying on March 10, 2006, and over
400,000 on May 1, 2006); Christopher Hawthorne, Architecture: Critic's Notebook, L.A. TIMES,
Dec. 31, 2006, at 1 (describing massive immigration-rights marches in Los Angeles that drew
over a half a million marchers on March 25, 2006, and an additional several hundred thousand
workers on May 1, 2006, calling these the largest political rallies outside of Washington, D.C.,
since the Vietnam era). Although some leaders called this the beginning of "the new civil rights
movement," Jessie Mangaliman, Immigration Rights Backers Marching On; CounterprotestAlso
Set Monday as Both Sides Seek to Send Message to Congress, SAN JOSE MERCURY NEWS, Sept. 2,
2006, at B1, some scholars are skeptical of this prospect, see Kevin R. Johnson & Bill Ong Hing,
The Immigrant Rights Marches of 2006 and the Prospects for a New Civil Rights Movement, 42
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 99, 101 (2007) ("We discern decidedly mixed signals about the possibility
of such a movement. Despite signs of promise and potential, there are many formidable hurdles
before the emergence of a new, multiracial civil rights movement.").
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Federalism in the context of immigration will have to account for
these peculiarities.
With regard to political accountability, there is no reason to
believe that either the federal government or states and localities will
be more accountable to non-citizens. 194 Again, non-citizens cannot vote
at any level of government. The interests of non-citizens may be
asserted by former non-citizens who have naturalized and thus can
now vote. In light of the uneven distribution of former non-citizens
around the country, some states and localities arguably will be more
responsive to current non-citizens. Where former non-citizens make
up a greater proportion of the population, they may have greater
influence. 195
Further, the divergent standards set under the authority
delegated by the PRWORA-with some states providing more
generous benefits than those given by the federal government-is
evidence that subnational levels of government are capable of
responsiveness to the interests of non-citizens. Indeed, permitting
states and localities to determine their own level of welcome to noncitizens might open the door for non-citizens to reward the more
welcoming states and localities with their presence. Permitting states
and localities to express their preferences also would help to inform
non-citizens what to expect in a given location.
Check on federal power. The power sharing envisioned by the
federal system was intended to ensure that the states were seen as
legitimate sources of power and therefore would retain their citizens'
loyalty, which would translate into the ability to check federal
excesses in any field of regulation. 196 If authority over an important
area like immigration were shared, it would make states and localities
more important in the eyes of their citizens, thus serving a
legitimating function.
Sharing immigration authority means that states and localities
also will be able to counteract federal immigration regulation.
Although the federal government could preempt state and local laws,

194. The federal government, in a way that states and localities simply are not, is
accountable to other nations, which is one of the arguments for federal exclusivity. My point here
concerns political accountability to individuals.
195. Other individuals besides former non-citizens will support measures that favor noncitizens, and certainly some former non-citizens will vote against measures that favor noncitizens. My point is not to predict with absolute certainty how individuals and groups will vote,
but is, rather, the unremarkable observation that voting preferences vary by location.
196. See Amar, supra note 163, at 1448-51.
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to the extent it has not done so, states and localities would remain free
197
to enact laws that run counter to federal policies.
In the international context, allowing for a range of
immigration regulation would let other countries know that there is a
diversity of opinion among U.S. citizens with regard to non-citizens.
Although this would mean that a state could send an anti-immigrant
message to other countries, contrary to the views of the U.S.
government, it also would mean that, in the face of a national antiimmigrant policy, a state could send a more positive message.
The need of the United States to speak with one voice would be
served by the national government's ability to preempt state and local
action.1 98 In this way, the preemption function would serve as an
important test of the strength of national policy: if the national
government truly believes that a particular policy is essential for
international relations, it can preempt contrary state and local
legislation. The tolerance of divergent views by states and localities
would be telling evidence of the strength of the national commitment
to the policy.199

In sum, once we recognize that federal exclusivity is not
constitutionally mandated, classic federalism arguments work well in
determining the appropriate allocation of authority among levels of
government. Moreover, if the federal government wishes to prevent
state and local governments from undertaking particular immigration
regulations, it always can statutorily preempt specified conduct.
C. Individual Rights
A focus on federalism in the immigration context should not
displace concern for individual rights. In addition to creating the
federal structure, the Constitution also is concerned centrally with the
rights of individuals. The issue of judicial review under the Equal

197. Depending on the particular politics in place at the time, the states and localities could
be enacting laws that are pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant, but arguably there is value either
way.
198. For example, when Illinois passed a law prohibiting employers in the state from using a
federal database to verify the immigration status of potential workers, the federal government
filed suit, claiming the state law was preempted by federal laws governing employee verification.
See supra note 68 and accompanying text.
199. Of course, this issue is complex, and the absence of federal preemption will not always
indicate a lack of commitment to a policy. But it would be some evidence.
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Protection Clause raises questions that go far beyond federalism.
Unlike almost any other area of shared authority, in the immigration
context there is a two-tired structure, with federal enactments subject
to rational basis review and at least some state and local enactments
subject to heightened scrutiny.20 0 The sharing of immigration
authority among levels of government arguably calls for the
unification of this standard, although it is not necessarily clear what
such unification would look like.
The resolution of this difficult and important question will
require greater debate and exploration than is possible in this Article.
For now, I simply note that the protection of individual rights is an
independent but related question to this Article's central concern.
IV. RETURNING TO IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

The competing values in federalism are always the subject of
debate and disagreement. But the above discussion demonstrates that
it is quite possible to take cognizance of important immigration
concerns within the framework-the language, arguments, and
interests-of federalism. Federalism is, in important ways, germane to
sound immigration policy concerns. Further, once we view
immigration through a federalism lens, it becomes apparent that
federalism concerns do not univocally support federal exclusivity.
Indeed, there is ample room for disagreement about which way the
competing values cut. This room for debate only underscores the need
to subject immigration to traditional arguments over federalism, as
opposed to setting immigration apart as structural preemption would
counsel.
To see how this might work in practice and to demonstrate the
implications of the constitutional argument that federal exclusivity
rests upon statutory, not structural, preemption, I return to an
examination of the three types of state and local conduct described
above. For all three types, a structural preemption understanding of
federal exclusivity precludes a role for state and local governments, or
at least significantly impinges on such a role. By contrast, a statutory
preemption understanding assumes that there is some role for
subnational governments to play and thus invites a balancing of the
interests of the national and subnational governments.

200. See supra text accompanying notes 30-34 (describing the heightened scrutiny of state
and local laws that restrict economic benefits for non-citizens lawfully in the country).
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A. DelegatingFederalImmigrationAuthority
An increasingly common state and local activity is the exercise
of delegated federal authority. Understanding federal exclusivity to
rest on statutory preemption means that no deviation is necessary
from traditional rules governing the constitutionality of federal
delegations. In the typical case, the question is whether the conferral
of authority is an impermissible delegation under Article J,201 and
whether non-federal actors are subject to "meaningful presidential
control," 20 2 an Article II concern. 20 3 In other words, if the congressional
delegation anticipates that the non-federal entity will fill in the
interstices of the law such that the non-federal entity could be
considered to be making law, this raises an Article I concern about an
entity other than Congress determining the content of federal law. If
the concern is that non-federal actors are implementing what is
clearly established federal law, this raises the concern that such actors
may not be acting pursuant to the direction of the President, thus
threatening the unitary executive and undermining the President's
Take Care responsibility.
Current law contemplates at least two kinds of delegation. As
described above, under section 287(g) of the INA, states and localities
may enter into agreements with the federal government to enforce
federal immigration law. 20 4 Pursuant to the agreement, the federal
government delegates its enforcement authority to the participating
state or locality, subject to federal supervision. Under the PRWORA,
the federal government delegates its authority to determine eligibility
for federal benefits to states and localities.
Assessing these delegations is relatively straightforward and
draws on the familiar constitutional tests set forth above. Under a
201. To the extent the exercise of discretion constitutes substantive lawmaking, there could
be a challenge under Article I. The question is framed, traditionally, in terms of the Vesting
Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 ("All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a
Congress of the United States .... "). There is a difference between a delegation from Congress to
federal agencies, which must involve no more guidance than an "intelligible principle," Whitman
v. Am. Trucking Ass'ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (citing J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United
States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)), and a delegation from Congress to a non-federal entity, which
is a much stickier wicket, cf. Norman R. Williams, Why Congress May Not "Overrule" the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 53 UCLA L. REV. 153, 221-27 (2005) ("Whitman involved a
delegation of rulemaking authority to a federal agency. The Court, however, has been far less
permissive of the delegation of rulemaking power to nonfederal entities.").
202. Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 922 (1997) (finding that "meaningful Presidential
control" is essential to a constitutional delegation of federal authority to state entities).
203. See U.S. CONST. art. 2, § 2 (setting forth the President's responsibility to "Take Care
that the [federal] Laws are faithfully executed").
204. See supra Part I.B.
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statutory preemption understanding of federal exclusivity, because a
state government can exercise the authority without a delegation
(assuming there is no federal statutory preemption), there is no reason
to think that the federal government cannot delegate its authority.
The only relevant question is whether the federal government's
20 5
greater leeway to regulate non-citizens follows the delegation.
Courts have reached different conclusions on this issue, 20 6 and it
remains an open question.
By contrast, a structural preemption view of federal authority
would cast doubt on the federal delegations. The structural question
would be whether, if something is committed so clearly to one
sovereign and not the other, the first sovereign can choose to share
some of that authority with the second. The answer would be a
qualified "no."
To begin with, the delegation of federal enforcement authority,
such as section 287(g), structural preemption would mean that the
national government could not delegate the authority to establish the
content of pure immigration laws because the Constitution has given
the sole authority to the national government. When it comes to the
enforcement of federally established laws, however, the national
government could delegate at least some enforcement authority to the
states because it simply would be requesting assistance from state and
local officials in what is decidedly a federal endeavor.
To differentiate these delegations, it is important to distinguish
among types of enforcement within immigration law. Some
enforcement activity, such as exercising arrest authority, arguably is
routine, whereas other enforcement activity, such as determining who
poses a national security threat, arguably requires the exercise of
discretion. Under a structural preemption view of federal exclusivity,
the constitutionality of the section 287(g) delegation would turn on the
type of enforcement authority delegated. On the one hand, the
national government could delegate the routine enforcement of
immigration laws, such as the arrest of a non-citizen unlawfully
crossing the border at a place other than a port of entry, because it
involves little discretion. 20 7 By contrast, if the federal government
205. As discussed above, when the federal government enacts an alienage law, that
enactment is subject to judicial review under the rational basis standard. By contrast, when a
state or locality does so, its enactment is subject to the strict scrutiny standard. See supra text
accompanying notes 30-34.
206. See supra note 53.
207. Two interesting questions in this regard are whether the rise of "vigilantes" on the
southern border is akin to private attorneys general in the private enforcement context, and
whether Congress could similarly empower such individuals to enforce federal immigration law.

2008]

IMMIGRATION FEDERALISM

841

authorized Arizona to place officers all along its border, establishing
mini ports of entry, and the state officers could make their own
determinations about which non-citizens were inadmissible under the
INA, the state initiative would run afoul of the structural
commitments in the Constitution because it would verge on
establishing substantive immigration law. 208 For this latter type of
delegation, it is a far closer question whether the federal government
could delegate such authority, even if it provides constitutionally
sufficient guidance and supervision. On the enforcement continuum,
section 287(g) falls closer to the discretionary end because it
authorizes state and local governments to exercise considerable
20 9
discretion, such as preparing an immigration case.
Next, as to the delegation of the authority to determine
eligibility for federal benefits, such as the PRWORA, under a
structural preemption view, the constitutionality of the delegation
would not be in question because it falls outside pure immigration
law. Thus, it is an authority shared with the states, albeit sometimes
subject to greater scrutiny when states exercise the authority. 210 The
only question would be whether the more lenient standard of review
could be delegated.
In sum, the convoluted analysis necessitated by a structural
preemption view of federal exclusivity is obviated by the conclusion
that federal exclusivity rests on statutory preemption. Assessing the
constitutionality is straightforward, and immigration remains in the
constitutional mainstream.
B. Inherent Enforcement Authority in the Absence of Delegation
The next question is whether, absent a delegation of federal
enforcement authority, states and localities possess inherent authority
to enforce federal immigration laws. 211 Once we understand that
See Gillian E. Metzger, Privatization as Delegation, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1367, 1461-80 (2003)
(analyzing the constitutional limits on delegation of governmental authority to private actors).
208. Today, the state-staffed port-of-entry hypothetical may well be "absurd," Wishnie, supra
note 7, at 566, and I use it simply for illustrative purposes. Moreover, I am not proposing a
bright line rule to distinguish circumstances where the legal authority question should come out
differently. I am simply pointing to a series of questions and noting that enforcement authority is
not monolithic.
209. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text (describing conduct authorized by section
287(g)).
210. See supra notes 51-53 and accompanying text (discussing federal legislation like the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act and the scrutiny with which
courts review its preemptive effects).
211. A related question is whether states and localities can choose not to enforce federal
immigration regulations. See Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 920 (1997) (applying the
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federal exclusivity rests on statutory preemption, the constitutionality
of state and local enforcement is fairly straightforward. A statutory
preemption view assumes that the Constitution does not exclusively
authorize the federal government to control pure immigration law, but
instead envisions some shared authority. Accordingly, because the
Constitution envisions a secondary role for states and localities in the
enactment of immigration law, this authority must include
enforcement authority. The Constitution would not allow a state to
enact an immigration law but forbid the state from enforcing it. The
only question is whether this inherent enforcement authority has been
statutorily preempted. The federal statutory preemption of state and
local authority to enact pure immigration law does not automatically
mean that the federal government also has preempted state and local
enforcement authority of immigration law. Instead, this is a question
212
of statutory interpretation.
By contrast, the structural preemption view of federal
exclusivity would mean that state and local authority to enforce
federal immigration laws, absent a delegation of authority from the
federal government, is unclear. A nontrivial argument could be made
that states and localities may enforce federal law to the extent that
the federal law concerns a subject over which states and localities
possess concurrent authority, such as criminal law. But where the
states possess no authority to regulate, it is questionable whether they
still could offer this assistance based on some idea of inherent
213
authority to enforce federal law in general.
Rejecting structural preemption would open the door to a
debate, based on federalism values, over the proper allocation of
enforcement authority. To touch on just a few of the relevant
federalism values, and without engaging in a complete analysis of the
anti-commandeering principle set forth in New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992), to a
law commandeering local law enforcement officers). For a discussion of this question, see Pham,
supra note 9.
212. See OLC Opinion, supra note 54, at 3-4 (finding no statutory preemption of enforcement
authority). Although there may be room for disagreement on this narrow statutory interpretation
issue, Congress could clarify the matter, as it has already tried to do once. See Border Protection,
Antiterrorism, and Illegal Immigration Control Act, H.R. 4437, 109th Cong. § 220 (2005) (stating
that there is no statutory preemption of state arrest authority in the area of immigration).
213. The OLC Opinion, without specifically addressing the basis for federal exclusivity,
concludes that states and localities do possess inherent enforcement authority, regardless of the
subject matter. OLC Opinion, supra note 54, at 11-13. The opinion uses the example of a
Canadian law enforcement officer arresting a non-citizen in Canada for a violation of United
States immigration law and says that there is no reason to believe the United States federal
government would deprive itself of this assistance. Id. at 3. But this example does not answer the
underlying and separate question of the authority of the non-federal officer to arrest for a
violation of a law of a separate sovereign.
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application of a federalism lens to the question of state and local
enforcement of immigration law, I note the following points.
Experimentalism is served by state and local enforcement of
immigration laws because each level of government would learn from
the various state and local experiences. For example, if one locality
invested considerable resources in immigration enforcement, resulting
in a substantial gain in the number of arrests for immigration
violations, this would inform the national government about the value
of such investments. If, however, the local enforcement also created
significant problems, such as racial profiling, decreased reporting of
crimes by non-citizens, and fewer arrests for other crimes, the
national government might reconsider its enlistment of state and local
officers and decide to preempt the conduct, and other localities might
decide to focus on matters of more local concern.
Efficiency and effectiveness may favor the practice, at least in
the view of those commentators who see state and local enforcement
as a "force multiplier," 214 enhancing both national security and the
effective enforcement of immigration laws. However, this efficiency
and effectiveness argument may be tempered by the lessons learned
from the states and localities.
Weighing against the practice is the protection of individual
rights. One of the central concerns about state and local enforcement
of immigration laws is the potential for racial profiling by law
enforcement officers who are not trained in immigration law and
therefore focus on non-white individuals. 2 15 The differential standard
of review for state and local laws would not apply here, although of
course a non-citizen could bring a claim for a violation of her civil
rights. These concerns thus may weigh against state and local
enforcement.
The interest of uniformity may be disserved by the practice.
Different states and localities will enforce federal immigration laws
with varying degrees of vigor and resources, and some will continue to
opt out of enforcement. Thus, non-citizens will be more or less
vulnerable depending on where they live and travel. Despite these
concerns, it is relevant that not all immigration law is uniform and
that the national government can choose to tolerate this lack of

214. See supranote 10 and accompanying text.
215. Kittrie, supra note 3, at 1477 (citing Michael J. Wishnie, Migration Regulation Goes
Local: The Role of the States in U.S. Immigration Policy, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 283, 291
(2002)).
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diverse state
uniformity (much in the way it has) by incorporating
2 16
criminal laws into the criminal deportability grounds.
Finally, as discussed above, increased political participation
and political accountability play out differently in the immigration
context. 217 We cannot draw the conclusion that state and local
enforcement of immigration laws necessarily reflects the views of
those affected. As a result, this value may not weigh heavily in one
2 18
direction or the other.
As even this brief analysis demonstrates, a federalism lens
would advance our understanding of the proper allocation of
enforcement authority among the levels of government. It leads to a
more dynamic relationship among levels of government and a better
appreciation and understanding of the interests at stake.
C. State and Local Laws Affecting Non-Citizens
Increasingly, state and local governments are enacting laws
that affect non-citizens. As discussed above, some laws express
hostility toward non-citizens, particularly unauthorized migrants,
while others express welcome and generosity. A statutory preemption
understanding of federal exclusivity would mean that courts would not
be immediately skeptical of such laws simply because they concern
non-citizens. Instead, a statutory preemption understanding begins
with the assumption that such laws are constitutionally proper, at
least to the extent that such actions accord with the authority of
subnational governments to regulate health, safety, and other matters
of local concern, and then asks whether Congress has preempted the
conduct at issue.
To elaborate, concluding that the Constitution allows shared
authority over pure immigration law does not mean that state and
local governments may insert themselves into the international arena.
Rather, state and local authority to enact pure immigration law is
rooted in the authority over matters of local concern. 21 9 Thus, the
question is whether, as the Supreme Court suggested in American
Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the state or local law at issue

216. See 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2) (2006) (setting forth deportability grounds, many of which turn
on violations of state criminal laws).
217. See supra text accompanying notes 190-195.
218. Not all of the federalism values that I have identified are relevant to this analysis. For
example, the value of providing a check on federal power provides less help in determining the
legality of the practice. But this is often true. Not every value in federalism is implicated in every
assertion of power by a state and local government.
219. See supra Part II.B.1.b-d.
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regulates a matter of traditional state concern, or whether the
regulation is not based on a state interest and instead is concerned
only with matters of national interest. 220 As the Court advised, this
assessment should focus on "the clarity or substantiality ... [ofi the
traditional importance of the state concern asserted."22 1 This analysis
is challenging and may lead to uncertainty, but it is the proper inquiry
in light of the shared authority over immigration. A federalism lens
would help structure the inquiry, balancing the interests of each level
of government.
By contrast, a structural preemption view of federal exclusivity
would distinguish immigration law from alienage law. In this view,
states and localities may exercise some authority over non-citizens in
the country but not over immigration. 222 By suggesting a core of
inviolable federal authority, structural preemption clouds the issue at
hand: the proper role, if any, of state and local governments.
Moreover, under current doctrine, it is difficult to distinguish proper
from improper state and local regulation. The Court has provided
some guidance in stating that a law that "has some purely speculative
and indirect impact on immigration ... does not thereby become a
constitutionally proscribed regulation of immigration." 22 3 This
guidance still leaves a tremendous amount of legislative gray area.
For example, although a state could not establish the number of
employment-based visas to be granted in a year, and it could regulate
the employment of specified non-citizens where such employment

220. See 539 U.S. 396, 419 n.l (2003) (distinguishing state power over areas of a state's
"traditional competence" and federal power over areas affecting foreign policy).
221. Id. This analysis is similar to that in Hines v. Davidowitz, where the Court struck down
a state alien registration act as preempted by a similar federal provision. 312 U.S. 52, 65-68
(1941). There, the Court acknowledged that the state may have possessed some authority to
enact the provision absent federal action, id. at 66, but found that a state action that affected
national interests might cross the line into impermissible state regulation, id. at 62-68. This
balancing of state and national interests both would be constitutionally familiar and would
better address the underlying concerns in the field of immigration. Such balancing would speak
to both structural concerns regarding the appropriate balance of power between the national and
sub-national levels of government, and the need to protect individual rights.
222. See DeCanas v. Bica, 424 U.S. 351, 355 (1976) ("[T]he fact that aliens are the subject of
a state statute does not render it a regulation of immigration, which is essentially a
determination of who should or should not be admitted into the country, and the conditions
under which a legal entrant may remain."). Assuming the provision does not concern
immigration as narrowly defined, the only question is whether the state or local law is
preempted by federal law. See Hines, 312 U.S. at 65-68 (finding that the validity of the state
alien registration statute turned on whether it was preempted by a similar provision in federal
law).
223. DeCanas, 424 U.S. at 355-56.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 61:3:787

residents,2 2 4 the
legal permanent
affect
would adversely
constitutionality of enactments that fall in between is unclear.
To demonstrate how a statutory preemption understanding of
federal exclusivity works in practice, consider the laws restricting
225
landlords from renting their premises to unauthorized migrants.
Under a statutory preemption view of immigration authority, these
laws would not be struck down simply because they affect
immigration. Local governments share immigration authority with the
other levels of government and thus may act absent federal statutory
preemption.226
This approach would only be the beginning of the constitutional
analysis. Using a federalism lens, courts, policymakers, and legal
scholars could understand the issues at stake more fully and assess
the constitutionality of the ordinances in a more refined manner. The
experimentalism,
competing values of federalism-uniformity,
efficiency and effectiveness, protection of fundamental rights,
increased political participation and political accountability, and a
check on federal power-would guide the analysis.
The interest in national uniformity may weigh against these
ordinances. The restrictions permit a locality to demonstrate a level of
hostility toward certain non-citizens, which may run contrary to the
interests of the national government in establishing at least some
minimum level of welcome. On the other hand, the ordinances apply
only to unauthorized migrants, not to legally present non-citizens. The
national government already has determined that non-citizens who do
not enter the country legally or who have overstayed their visas are
deportable. 227 In this way, the ordinances do not contradict national
policy and, debatably, help reinforce that policy by making life more
difficult for unauthorized migrants.
Alternatively, it could be argued that the national government
purposefully has chosen to underenforce immigration laws and in this
way has consented to the presence of the unauthorized migrants.
Despite the political appeal of this argument, unauthorized migrants,
224. This was the state provision the Court upheld in DeCanas, which the Court found to
present only a "purely speculative and indirect impact on immigration." Id. at 355.
225. See supratext accompanying notes 1, 61.
226. I refer here only to federal immigration laws and do not determine whether other
federal laws, such as the Fair Housing Act, may preempt these local ordinances. See 42 U.S.C. §§
3604-06 (2000) (prohibiting discrimination by national origin in real estate rental, sales, or
brokerage practices).
227. See 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A) (declaring generally "inadmissible" any alien who enters
the United States "at any time or place other than as designated by the Attorney General"); id. §
1227(a)(1)(B) (declaring deportable any alien who is present in the United States illegally, any
alien whose visa has been revoked, and any alien who has overstayed a legal visa).
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in legal terms, are in the United States contrary to the will of the
national government. The national government already has decided
that the non-citizens affected by these ordinances should have no level
of welcome whatsoever. 228 Viewed in this light, the ordinances are
229
simply a local expression of a national sentiment.
Experimentalism may weigh in favor of these ordinances. Such
laws help to inform states and localities about more and less effective
means of encouraging and discouraging migration. If unauthorized
migrants choose not to settle in localities with these ordinances, other
localities would know that these laws are effective. Similarly, if, as in
Colorado and Riverside, New Jersey, anti-immigrant laws thwart
other interests, particularly economic interests, 230 localities would
learn about the costs of such measures before adopting them. Allowing
these competing interests to be played out on a local, rather than
national, level may be preferable. If the experiment is too costly in
social and economic terms, it will not be repeated more widely, and the
harm will have been limited geographically.
Similar arguments can be made about efficiency and
effectiveness. The ordinances will help to inform other governments
about the costs and benefits of these measures. The ordinances also
will help to inform non-citizens about where they are welcome and
where they are not, indicating this with finer distinctions than
national or even state-level policies. For example, if a state were to
provide health care to unauthorized migrants, as proposed in
California, 231 this might encourage such non-citizens to settle
anywhere in the state. But anti-immigrant local ordinances would tell
a non-citizen in which part of the state the non-citizen should settle.

228. A contrary view could be found in the reasoning of Plyler v. Doe, which acknowledged
the reality of the presence of a sizeable class of unauthorized migrants and expressed concern
that this class was only growing over time. 457 U.S. 202, 218-19 (1982).
229. The heightened standard of judicial review under the Equal Protection Clause would
not apply here, because that standard is used only for laws affecting non-citizens lawfully in the
country. See supra Part L.A (discussing different degrees of scrutiny courts use in reviewing
distinctions based on alienage). Thus, if a state or locality chose to enact a similar law affecting
lawful non-citizens, the analysis would differ significantly.
230. See supranotes 180-181 (describing difficulties for employers in Colorado after the state
passed anti-immigrant measures; also describing economic downturn experienced by Riverside,
New Jersey, after it enacted anti-immigrant legislation, leading the town to repeal the
legislation).
231. See Jennifer Steinhauer, California Planfor Health Care Would Cover All, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 9, 2007, at Al (describing a bill introduced by Governor Schwarzenegger that would
guarantee health care coverage to California's thirty-six million residents, including one million
uninsured unauthorized migrants). The proposal was later voted down by a state Senate
committee, partly for budgetary reasons. See Jesse McKinley & Kevin Sack, California Senate
Panel Rejects Health Coverage Proposal,N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 29, 2007, at A14.
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Similarly, knowing which states provide in-state tuition to
unauthorized migrants also would give non-citizens some sense of
what to expect in that state, although not necessarily in any particular
locality.
These laws may provide inadequate protection for individual
rights. The differential standard of review under the Equal Protection
Clause is unlikely to help because the ordinances do not involve
economic benefits provided by the state. This value thus would appear
to weigh against anti-immigrant ordinances. But for immigrantfriendly laws-such as the availability of municipal identification
cards in New Haven and San Francisco, as well as the multiple instate tuition laws-a rule respecting state and local enactments would
protect the interests of non-citizens. In light of the diversity of state
and local enactments, there can be no blanket rule about state and
local enactments and individual rights.
Turning to increased political participation and political
accountability, the landlord laws are excellent examples of how these
values play out differently in the immigration context. We cannot
assume that the laws reflect the views of those affected because the
non-citizens could not participate in the process, at least not directly.
Additionally, the laws carry a high potential for parochialism and
232
imposing costs on neighboring communities.
Finally, these ordinances may be a check on federal power in
the following, somewhat unusual, manner. To the extent that the
federal government's approach to unauthorized migration is
disingenuous-passing laws prohibiting it but then not enforcing
those laws in a manner that actually stops unauthorized migrationthe ordinances enforce the national policy when the national
government is unwilling to do so.
In sum, a statutory preemption view of federal exclusivity
opens the door for this type of analysis, leading to a far more
constructive and structured debate over the role for state and local
governments. The federal government always can statutorily preempt
particular state and local conduct, but to the extent that it has not,

232. See Samuel Issacharoff & Catherine M. Sharkey, Backdoor Federalization,53 UCLA L.
REV. 1353, 1370-72 (2006) (discussing the danger of the "spillover" effect of a state law that
"shifts costs and favors its own citizens while disproportionately affecting out-of-state interests").
Whether this decisionmaking should be devolved to the local level is another matter. Under the
steam valve rationale, permitting smaller units of government to express anti-immigrant
hostility may take the pressure off larger units of government. Spiro, supra note 6, at 1628-46.
But the potential for these local governments to affect other localities adversely, particularly
nearby, is great.
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this kind of analysis will help to evaluate the propriety of the
subnational regulation.

I offer this discussion not to predict the resolution of the
particular conflicts. Instead, I offer it to demonstrate that the values
of federalism provide a nuanced tool for examining the interests at
stake. Further, this discussion shows that rejecting structural
preemption does not necessarily mean that all actions by state and
local governments are constitutionally permissible. In the current
debate, there are only two options: first, adherence to structural
preemption, which would cast a long shadow over any state or local
involvement in immigration regulation; second, a complete rejection of
structural preemption, which would open the door to all state and
local regulation. My argument is that we need a more careful and
appropriately tailored approach to evaluating state and local
immigration regulation rather than these two stark choices. The
federalism lens provides such an approach.
I recognize that weighing competing federalism values is not
an easy task for any decisionmaker and is particularly challenging for
courts.23 3 But this balancing is essential to capture the various
interests at stake in immigration federalism. Moreover, courts appear
to engage in similar balancing in many other areas of constitutional
law, including determinations of the proper allocation of authority
among levels of government. 23 4 The likely alternative-leaving the
233. Cf. Lon L. Fuller, The Forms and Limits ofAdjudication, 92 HARV. L. REV. 353, 394-404
(1978) (describing the difficulty of judicial resolution of "polycentric" disputes).
234. See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 457-64 (1991) (applying federalism principles in
assessment of state law concerning mandatory retirement for judges); Louis Henkin, Infallibility
Under Law: Constitutional Balancing, 78 COLUM. L. REV. 1022, 1047 (1978) (describing
constitutional balancing tests as posing some concerns, but also arguing that they "provide[] an
answer, or the way to an answer-sometimes the only answer-to what the Constitution means
when the words do not say what it means, to many a constitutional tension or issue not readily
resolved without it," and that "[t]he flexibility it provides may have been an important ingredient
in making judicial review work and rendering it acceptable"); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, More
Is Not Less: A Rejoinder to Professor Marshall, 80 Nw. U. L. REV. 571, 572-73 (1985) ("[T]he fact
that there are not easy solutions or determinate answers does not explain why [balancing] is
undesirable .... [C]ourts constantly choose between competing values in situations where no
easy or determinate answers exist .... Upholding equality inevitably sacrifices liberty; ending
discrimination eliminates someone's liberty to discriminate. The examples are endless; it is
difficult to even think of many important constitutional cases in which a difficult value conflict
does not exist."); cf. Paul Schiff Berman, Cyberspace and the State Action Debate: The Cultural
Value ofApplying ConstitutionalNorms to "Private"Regulation, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1263, 130708 (2000) ("[A]lthough it is certainly possible to criticize the use of balancing tests, such tests
have the virtue of permitting courts to articulate essential values and principles while at the
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federalism debate to the political arena and requiring courts to defer
to reasonable political resolutions-presents its own difficulties. In
light of this Article's argument that state and local immigration
regulation is constitutionally permissible (if not otherwise preempted
through the Supremacy Clause), competing political actors inevitably
will reach conflicting resolutions on how to regulate immigration.
Requiring courts to defer to the political process begs the question
which political resolution should take precedence. 235 Without the blunt
tool of structural preemption, and in cases where there is no statutory
preemption, courts will need to reach some resolution. The federalism
lens proposed in this Article will aid their assessment.
D. Presumptions
A separate but related question is what type of statutory
preemption should apply in the immigration context. The rules
governing preemption counsel that, at least in matters traditionally
regulated by the state there is a presumption against federal
preemption.2 3 6 In such cases, congressional intent to preempt must be
clear. 237 This intent may be either express or implied. 238 Implied
preemption can be found when federal regulation is so comprehensive
that the federal government is said to have occupied the field, leaving
no room for state regulation 239 and where a state law conflicts with the
240
goals of or methods chosen by Congress.

same time recognizing that applying these principles must necessarily depend on a nuanced
examination of the circumstances of each case. As discussed previously, courts are educative and
expressive institutions as well as adjudicative bodies; therefore articulating foundational
principles can be as important as providing a fixed resolution to possible future cases.").
235. If the federal government has not used the Supremacy Clause to override state and local
conduct, it is far from clear that federal policies should prevail. RAMSEY, supra note 85, at 285-86
(describing the role of the Supremacy Clause not only in enhancing federal power but also in
protecting state power by limiting federal supremacy to, inter alia, laws duly enacted).
236. Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947) (holding that there is no
presumption of federal exclusivity "in a field which the states have traditionally occupied").
237. Id. ("[W]e start with the assumption that the historic police powers of the States were
not to be superseded by the Federal Act unless that was the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress.").
238. See Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 461 U.S.
190, 203-04 (1983) (holding that, in the absence of explicit intent, courts may infer preemptive
intent from the presence of extensive federal regulation).
239. Id.; Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. at 230.
240. Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 203-04; see also Wis. Pub. Intervenor v. Mortier, 501 U.S. 597, 605
(1991) ("Even when Congress has not chosen to occupy a particular field, pre-emption may occur
to the extent that state and federal law actually conflict.").
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In matters where the federal government traditionally has
24 1
dominated, however, there is no presumption against preemption,
and courts grapple with whether the entire field should be found
preempted because of superior federal interests. 242 This "field
preemption" does not turn on a constitutional commitment to
exclusive federal authority (a structural preemption argument);
instead it turns on the extent to which the federal government has
regulated the entire field and thus preempted a role for state and local
action. 243 In light of the federal interest in immigration, courts may be
more willing to find field preemption, but this field preemption is a
type of statutory preemption. The federal government is not ousting
state and local authority based on exclusive federal authority; rather
it is ousting state and local authority because of the thoroughness of
244
federal statutory law.
Although the Supreme Court often has found preemption in the
immigration context, 245 it has not stated categorically that there is no
role for states to play. In Hines v. Davidowitz, the Court acknowledged
some state authority, finding that the state law was "enacted in the
exercise of powers not controverted." 246 But the Court found this
authority preempted because of the comprehensive federal
247
regulation.
In the analogous foreign affairs context, the Court has
acknowledged that it is possible to balance state and federal interests.
In American Insurance Association v. Garamendi, the Court stated
that it need not choose between field and conflict preemption in the
context of foreign affairs. 248 It noted that the two could be
complementary: If a state regulated a matter on which it had no claim
to be addressing an issue of traditional state concern, then "field
preemption might be the appropriate doctrine" to reflect "the
241. See United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 108 (2000) (noting that there is no assumption
against preemption when states regulate in areas with "a history of significant federal
presence"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-31, at 1210 (3d ed. 2000)
("If the area is deemed 'national,' the Court is more vigilant in striking down what would amount
to state incursions into subjects that Congress may have validly reserved to itself.").
242. See Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 419-20 (2006) (finding that the Court
need not resolve whether the doctrine of field preemption should apply to foreign affairs, instead
noting that the doctrines of field and conflict preemption may complement each other).
243. TRIBE, supra note 241, § 6-28, at 1172-73.
244. Id.
245. See, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52, 62-69, 72-74 (1941) (finding that the federal
Alien Registration Act preempted a Pennsylvania statute requiring the registration of aliens).
246. Id. at 66 (quoting Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. 1, 211 (1824)).
247. See id. at 69-74 (reviewing extensive reach of federal immigration law in areas in which
Pennsylvania law attempted to regulate).
248. 539 U.S. 396, 419-20.
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that the Constitution entrusts foreign policy exclusively

to the national Government. '' 249 But if a state acted within its area of
"traditional competence," even if the regulation affects foreign
relations, courts should analyze the state law to see if there is a
conflict with federal law, and the preemption should turn on "the
clarity or substantiality ... [of] the traditional importance of the state
250

concern asserted."
The Garamendi approach provides considerable guidance in
the immigration context. It acknowledges concurrent state authority
but allows federal statutory preemption, even field preemption, when
the state's interests are more circumspect and fall outside its
traditional domain. Thus, if a state tried to enact an immigration law
that was intended to protect the health and safety of state residents,
the fact that the regulation also affected immigration should be
insufficient to find the state conduct preempted. Instead, a court
would have to engage in the more careful balancing suggested in
Garamendi, weighing the interests of the national and subnational
governments.
CONCLUSION

The traditional understanding of pure immigration lawnarrowly defined as the rules governing the admission and removal of
non-citizens--is that state and local governments are structurally
preempted from playing a role. This view is misguided. There is no
such constitutional mandate. Instead, federal exclusivity in the
admission and removal of non-citizens is better understood to rest on
ordinary statutory preemption. The various levels of government
share authority over immigration, subject to preemption by federal
statute. A statutory preemption understanding of federal exclusivity is
supported by the text and structure of the Constitution, best explains
varied historical practices, and is not foreclosed by Supreme Court
precedent.

249. Id. at 419 n.ll.
250. Id. Applying this understanding retrospectively elucidates the reasoning in Crosby v.
National Foreign Trade Council, 530 U.S. 363 (2000). In that case, Massachusetts had enacted a
law restricting state agencies from purchasing goods or services from companies that conducted
business with Myanmar. Id. at 370-71. The Court struck down the law because it conflicted with
federal law. See id. at 372-74 (finding the state law preempted, thus declining to decide whether
field preemption applies to foreign affairs). Although the Court did not reach the distinction
between field and conflict preemption, it did note that Massachusetts was inserting itself directly
into the debate over the proper treatment of Myanmar, instituting a "state system of economic
pressure against the Burmese political regime." Id. at 376. Massachusetts was not, in other
words, acting within an area of traditional state competence.
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Concluding that the Constitution permits shared authority
over pure immigration law lifts the shadow of constitutional
skepticism currently cast over the immigration-related conduct of
state and local governments. It also creates an opportunity for this
conduct to be evaluated through traditional and familiar
constitutional rules, including the application of a federalism lens to
determine the proper allocation of authority.
Rejecting structural preemption does not validate all state and
local immigration regulations. But instead of the blunt tool of
structural preemption, we should use a federalism lens as an
evaluative and normative tool for determining the proper allocation of
immigration authority among levels of government. A federalism lens
structures the debate and clarifies the issues at stake. It also better
accounts for the divergent interests of all levels of government.
Although the Constitution embodies competing values, immigration is
not so different from other areas of law that it deserves its own set of
constitutional rules. Instead, immigration should be brought back into
the fold.

Working at the Boundaries of
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and the Economic Dimension
of Employment Relationships
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Noah D. Zatz
"Who is a worker?" The answer often determines who
receives legal protection or support, and who does not. Disputes over
this question animate both feminist scholarship examining
nonmarket work and labor law scholarship examining how labor
market restructuring challenges legal definitions of employment.
This Article brings together these two lines of inquiry. It shows how
the legal category of employment relies on distinctions between
market and nonmarket work, and does so well beyond the familiar
context of family labor.
By examining prison inmates' statutory employment law
claims, I identify a previously unrecognized economic dimension to
disputes over the employment relationship's scope. This economic
dimension is analytically distinct from the traditional control
dimension rooted in agency law. Courts often hold that prisoners
are not employees because their efforts are not economic in
character, even though the work is done for pay. Throughout
employment law, similar issues arise about work in welfare,
educational, medical, and religious institutions. What unites these
disputes over paid nonmarket work is that courts are torn between
two rival accounts of what makes employment economic. The more
restrictive one requires a market relationship; the more expansive
one requires productive work. I show that neither approach is
viable.
Understanding employment's economic dimension requires
a new approach to employment law. Employment law does not
simply identify and regulate a relationship that exists independently
in society. Instead, employment law helps to constitute employment
as an economic relationship, to promote its coherence, its
distinctiveness, and its location in the market economy.
Employment law fosters the very divide between economic and
noneconomic relationshipsto which it purports to respond.

